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GOVERNMENTAL INACTION AS A
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT: DESHANEY
AND ITS AFTERMATH
Thomas A. Eaton* and Michael Wells**
Abstract: DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services is the Supreme
Court's first major effort to define the scope of state and local governments' affirmative
obligations under the fourteenth amendment. The Court rejected liability against a county
welfare agency and a caseworker for failing to prevent a father from severely beating his
four-year-old son. The Court intimated that constitutional affirmative duties exist only
where the plaintiff is in the state's custody. Scholarly commentary reads the case as
announcing a sweeping prohibition against the imposition of affirmative duties in other
contexts. Professors Eaton and Wells demonstrate that the DeShaney opinion is more
ambiguous and less categorical than the preliminary scholarly consensus suggests. They
argue that much of the Court's reasoning supports a more discriminating treatment of
constitutional affirmative duties; one that acknowledges the various ways in which the
state may play a part in making someone vulnerable to harm. Although in DeShaney's
aftermath some lower courts embrace the "sweeping prohibition" view of the Supreme
Court's opinion, many other courts examine the state's role in exposing the plaintiff to
danger. Professors Eaton and Wells prefer the latter approach, arguing that it should be
combined with an inquiry into the governmental defendant's state of mind, an issue the
Court did not address in DeShaney.
Is the Constitution solely "a charter of negative liberties"1 shielding
us against intrusions by state officers upon our freedom? Or does it
also encompass "positive rights" to governmental aid? If the Consti-
tution sometimes does require government officials to help persons in
distress, what circumstances trigger a duty to act? These questions
were before the Supreme Court last Term in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services. 2
Joshua DeShaney, a four-year-old child beaten repeatedly by his
father, sued social workers assigned to his case for failing to do any-
thing about the attacks. Joshua's lawyer charged that the social work-
ers' inaction, in the face of strong evidence of abuse, amounted to a
deprivation of Joshua's liberty in violation of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Rejecting Joshua's claim, the Court
asserted that the purpose of the due process clause was "to protect the
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law; B.A. 1972, University of Texas;
J.D. 1975, University of Texas. The authors wish to thank Robert Brussack, Dan Coenen, and
Joseph Singer for their helpful comments on a draft of this paper.
** Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law; B.A. 1972, University of
Virginia; J.D. 1975, University of Virginia.
I. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 318 (1980).
2. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
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people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them
from each other."3 The Court recognized that an affirmative duty
may arise when the state has contributed to the plaintiff's need for
assistance. In DeShaney, even though "the State may have been aware
of the dangers that Joshua faced" in his father's home, it "played no
part in their creation, nor did it... render him any more vulnerable to
them."
4
In one respect, DeShaney is only the most recent in a long line of
cases struggling to define the boundary between tort claims governed
by state law and those of constitutional dimension.5 The distinctive
aspect of DeShaney is its focus on affirmative duties. The distinguish-
ing characteristic of affirmative duty cases is that the plaintiff seeks
damages not from the actor who commits the harm but from a govern-
mental official who somehow made the plaintiff more vulnerable to, or
failed to prevent, the harm. The defendant may be a jailor who
releases a dangerous inmate, or a social services worker who allows a
child to remain in the custody of a parent who beats him, or a police-
man who promises to defend the plaintiff against attacks and then
reneges.
The affirmative duty problem has long fascinated courts and com-
mentators, because it raises perplexing philosophical questions about
liberty, utility, and moral responsibility.6 Although constitutionally
based affirmative duty claims raise profound issues that go to the heart
of the relationship between the government and its citizens, these
issues have received scant attention in the constitutional context.7
3. Id. at 1003.
4. Id. at 1006.
5. Prior decisions featuring this theme include Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986);
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Martinez v.
California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651 (1977); and Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). For our views on the issue, see
Wells & Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REV.
201 (1984).
6. See, e.g., Soldano v. O'Daniels, 141 Cal. App. 3d 443, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1983); Yania v.
Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959); Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058
(1901). Important scholarly works include M. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO AcT (1977); Ames, Law
and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv. 97, 110-13 (1908); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 151, 197-201 (1973); Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans and
Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978); Weinrib,
The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980).
7. Academic commentary on the affirmative constitutional obligations includes Beermann,
Administrative Failure and Local Democracy: The Politics of DeShaney, 1990 DUKE L.J. _;
Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the Constitution, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 407 (1966); Bork, The
Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695; Currie,
Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986); Michelman,
Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7
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Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional Tort
While the Supreme Court has recognized an obligation of government
to provide for the basic needs of prison inmates, mental patients, and
others it confines,' DeShaney marks the first time the Court has
addressed affirmative duty issues in a broader context.
Laurence Tribe, Aviam Soifer, and others have criticized DeShaney
for its rigid distinction between "affirmative" and "negative" govern-
mental duties. In an age in which government reaches virtually every
aspect of daily life, they say, it is formalistic and naive to accord deci-
sive weight to the difference between active and passive defaults by
officials.9 Our own focus, however, is far less abstract. The ines-
capable reality is that constitutional affirmative duty claims will con-
tinue to press for judicial recognition in the post-DeShaney world.
Our goal is to point the way for courts and lawyers called on to deal
with these cases. To this end, we seek to address the questions that
remain to be decided in the wake of DeShaney. We explore the
strengths and weaknesses of the Court's analysis in DeShaney in an
effort to develop a practical framework for resolving future constitu-
tional affirmative duty cases.
Framing this analytical structure entails three main steps. Initially,
we examine the DeShaney opinion in order to identify the issues left
open by the Court's disposition of the case. There are two shortcom-
ings in the Court's treatment of the affirmative duty issue. First, in
justifying its broad dicta rejecting affirmative duties in the absence of
some state responsibility for the plaintiff's plight, the Court barely
(1969); Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 Sup. Cr. REV. 199; Tribe, The
Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of
Dependence, 99 HARv. L. REv. 330 (1985).
For an early effort to shed light on the intersection between constitutional tort and affirmative
duty, see Wells & Eaton, Affirmative Duty and Constitutional Tort, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1
(1982). We return to this question here because the Supreme Court has decided a number of
cases bearing on the problem in one way or another in the years since our earlier article was
published and the analysis we presented there has been somewhat superseded by the Court's
more recent work.
8. See Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239 (1983); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
9. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space. What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern
Physics, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8-14 (1989); Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the "Free
World" of DeShaney, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1513 (1989); Strauss, Due Process, Government
Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 Sup. Cr. REV. 53; The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, 103
HARV. L. REV. 40, 172-74 (1989); see also Whitman, Government Responsibility for
Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REv. 225, 226, 253-54 (1986). Indeed, the distinction between
acts and omissions often turns on how one poses the question. Assume, for example, a policeman
impounds a car, arrests the driver, and leaves the children-passengers stranded on a busy
highway. Are the children endangered by the officer's acts of impounding the car and arresting
the driver, or by his failure to take them to a place of safety? Cf White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d
381 (7th Cir. 1979).
Washington Law Review
touches on the purposes of the fourteenth amendment and the teach-
ings of its own precedents. Instead, the Court resorts to a highly selec-
tive citation to its prior cases and places more weight on the language
of the due process clause than its own decisions show the clause can
bear. Resolution of future affirmative duty cases will require reference
not only to DeShaney but also to the full body of Supreme Court
precedents on the meaning of the due process clause. Second, the
Court's discussion in DeShaney of the level of state involvement
needed to trigger imposition of an affirmative duty is itself ambivalent
and unhelpful because it moves from one possible standard to another
and then another without ever choosing among them. At one point
the focus is on "involuntary confinement"; 10 at another it is on
whether the plaintiff's situation is "analogous to incarceration or insti-
tutionalization";11 and at yet another it is on whether the victim is left
in a "worse position than that in which he would have been had [the
official] not acted at all."1" This panoply of approaches reveals the
substantial uncertainty that remains in this area of the law, and thus
highlights the need for developing a coherent framework for analyzing
affirmative duty cases.
Our second goal is to move beyond the language of the DeShaney
opinion to identify the considerations that properly bear on the viabil-
ity of constitutional tort suits for government inaction. The resolution
of constitutional tort questions requires courts to address two areas of
doctrine. Because tort liability is at issue, it is necessary to evaluate
the considerations of tort policy that bear on whether recognition of
an affirmative duty is appropriate. Specifically, the court must balance
the importance of maintaining official discretion in the deployment of
government resources against the benefits to persons in distress who
will be helped if a duty is imposed. Of course, even if the benefits of a
duty to aid outweigh the costs, it does not follow that such a duty may
be imposed as a matter of constitutional law. Yet, reason and author-
ity-including the DeShaney decision itself-suggest that a constitu-
tional duty will arise if government conduct is sufficiently egregious.
We contend that it is appropriate to recognize an affirmative constitu-
tional duty only when government inaction can be characterized as an
"abuse of power."
The third step in forging a practical framework for resolving affirm-
ative duty claims is to formulate concrete guidelines for deciding cases.
10. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1005-06 (1989).
11. Id. at 1006 n.9.
12. Id. at 1006.
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We submit that constitutional tort liability for government inaction
must rest on two factors: the degree of state involvement in producing
the plaintiff's plight and the defendant's state of mind. This approach
builds on the Court's holding in DeShaney that there is no constitu-
tional duty to act absent some state involvement with the plaintiff's
need for assistance. In addition, it seeks to plug the gap created by
DeShaney's failure to specify the type of state involvement that will
trigger an affirmative duty.
We argue that limiting affirmative duties to instances of involuntary
confinement or analogues of confinement is arbitrary and unwise.
Such tests do not reach the full range of cases in which the state may
significantly contribute to the plaintiff's need for assistance. Rather,
the familiar tort concept of "special relationships" can best identify
the types of state involvement that should give rise to an affirmative
duty.
The second criterion that courts must focus on is the defendant's
state of mind, a factor the DeShaney majority neither needed to nor
did consider. In determining whether a given failure to act is a consti-
tutional violation, it is essential to determine how much the official
knew about the plaintiff and his need for help. In keeping with both
settled authority and widely accepted notions of justice, a standard of
"deliberate indifference" is an appropriate measure of whether a par-
ticular instance of government inaction fairly may be characterized as
abusive.
In the wake of DeShaney there is a pressing need to develop stan-
dards for distinguishing between proper and improper constitutional
affirmative-duty claims. The thesis of this Article is that the best test
is one focusing on whether the governmental official exhibits "deliber-
ate indifference" toward the plaintiff's need for help after the govern-
ment has created a special relationship between the plaintiff and itself.
I. DESHANEY. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Consider this case: Upon walking out of a nightclub into its parking
lot late at night, a man is attacked by robbers. A policeman sits in his
patrol car thirty yards away and watches, but does nothing to stop the
attack. After the muggers have left, the policeman drives over and
tells the victim's friends to take him away.13 Has the policeman vio-
lated a constitutional duty? Should the policeman's motive for not
helping make a difference? Suppose the officer is not liable on these
facts. Would the result be different if the nightclub's owner had spe-
13. See Tucker v. Callahan, 867 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1989).
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cifically requested police protection after a number of similar inci-
dents, and had foregone private security arrangements in reliance on
the police chief's promise that an officer would be present? Suppose
the attackers have a long record of such behavior, and were recently
released by parole officials despite strong evidence that they would
again commit violent crimes. Might these officials be held liable for a
constitutional tort? The Supreme Court began the process of untangl-
ing these knots with its decision in DeShaney.
A. The Facts of the Case
Joshua DeShaney was born in 1979.14 A year later, his parents
divorced and a Wyoming court awarded custody of Joshua to his
father, Randy. Shortly thereafter, Randy and Joshua moved to Win-
nebago County, Wisconsin. Randy remarried, but this second mar-
riage also was short lived. In January 1982, at the time of their
divorce, Randy's second wife informed county authorities that Joshua
might be a victim of child abuse. Randy denied the allegations when
interviewed by Department of Social Service (DSS) officials, and no
action was taken. A year later, Joshua was hospitalized with multiple
cuts and bruises. The examining physician notified DSS of his suspi-
cions of child abuse. DSS obtained a court order placing Joshua in the
temporary custody of the hospital. A "Child Protection Team"' 5 met
and considered Joshua's situation. They determined there was insuffi-
cient evidence to remove Joshua permanently from the custody of his
father. The team recommended that Randy secure counseling serv-
ices, that Joshua be enrolled in a preschool program, and that Randy's
current girlfriend be encouraged to move out of the house. Randy
signed an agreement promising to accomplish these goals. Based on
the recommendation of the Child Protective Team, the juvenile court
dismissed the child protection case and returned Joshua to the custody
of his father.
Over the next fourteen months, Joshua's situation did not improve.
In February 1983, emergency room personnel notified DSS that
Joshua had again suffered injuries suggesting physical abuse. During
the next six months, the caseworker handling Joshua's file observed a
number of suspicious injuries. She also was aware that Randy had not
complied with the voluntary agreement as Joshua was not enrolled in
14. Our account of the facts in DeShaney is taken from the Supreme Court's opinion, 109 S.
Ct. at 1001-02, and the Seventh Circuit's opinion, 812 F.2d 298, 299-300 (7th Cir. 1987).
15. The team consisted of a pediatrician, a psychologist, a police detective, the county
attorney, several DSS caseworkers, and various hospital personnel.
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a preschool program and the girlfriend was still living in the house. In
November 1983, the emergency room again notified DSS that Joshua
had been treated for injuries they believed to be caused by child abuse.
On the next two visits to the DeShaney home, the caseworker was told
that Joshua was too ill to see her.
Despite this chronology of incidents, the caseworker did not initiate
any action to remove Joshua from his father's custody. In March
1984, Randy beat Joshua so severely that he fell into a coma. Surgery
revealed a series of hemorrhages caused by blows to the head inflicted
over a long period of time. Joshua is expected to spend the rest of his
life confined to an institution for the profoundly retarded.
B. In the Courts
Joshua and his mother filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the county, DSS, and various individual employees of DSS
alleging that they deprived Joshua of his liberty without due process of
law by failing to intervene to protect him from his father. The district
court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Seventh Cir-
cuit aT ed on two grounds. First, the court held that the defendants
had no duty under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to protect Joshua from the violent acts of his father. Second, the
causal connection between the defendants' conduct and Joshua's inju-
ries was too attenuated to establish a deprivation of constitutional
rights actionable under section 1983.16
In affirming the lower courts, the Supreme Court issued a sweeping
condemnation of affirmative duties under the due process clause,
stressing that "the Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's
power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and
security."' 7 The Court cited the language and history of the four-
teenth amendment as well as prior decisions in support of its conclu-
sion that the due process clause is not a source of affirmative
obligations. The Court declared that no constitutional duty arises
when the government has no connection with the plaintiff's need for
assistance other than its ability to help.
The majority, however, recognized that Joshua was not a random
victim of violence with whom the state had no prior relationship.
Caseworkers, child protection teams, and courts had determined that
Joshua would remain in the custody of his father. A social worker was
assigned to keep an eye on the family. Joshua's attorney argued that
16. DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 301-02.
17. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003.
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these connections established a "special relationship," so that state
agents had an affirmative obligation to protect him from the special
danger of abuse at his father's hands.
In addressing this contention, the Court acknowledged that "in cer-
tain limited circumstances the Constitution imposes upon the State
affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to particular
individuals.""8 Thus, Estelle v. Gamble 9 had found that such a duty
arises under the eighth amendment to protect incarcerated prisoners,
while Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital2 ° and Youngberg v.
Romeo21 had cited the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment in extending this affirmative duty to pretrial detainees and invol-
untarily committed mental patients. In DeShaney, however, the Court
found that this line of cases was not controlling.
The Court emphasized three factors in concluding that Joshua did
not have a special relationship with the state. First, the state did not
create Joshua's need for protection. It was Randy DeShaney, a pri-
vate individual, who was abusing his infant son. Second, this case dif-
fered from Estelle, Revere and Youngberg, in that the state did not
confine Joshua, deprive him of means of self defense, or take other
positive steps to render him powerless to protect himself. Third, the
state's limited intervention in the situation did not render Joshua
"more vulnerable" to the dangers or worsen his position.22 He was
endangered by his father before the DSS investigation and no action of
the defendants increased that risk.
Having concluded that Joshua was not deprived of liberty by state
actors, the Court was able to avoid a number of other issues. For
example, the Court did not address what state of mind is necessary to
make out a substantive due process claim where a special relationship
does exist, or whether the defendants in such a case might be entitled
to a qualified immunity. 23 Furthermore, given the posture of the case,
the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether Wisconsin child
18. Id. at 1004-05.
19. 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976) ("deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness" creates
a cause of action under § 1983); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326-27 (1986)
(suggesting "that a similar state of mind is required to make out a substantive due process claim
in the prison setting," quoted in DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005 n.5).
20. 463 U.S. 239 (1983).
21. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
22. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006.
23. Id. at 1007 n.10. Compare Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212 (1988), modified, 879 F.2d
583 (9th Cir. 1989) (no qualified immunity in an affirmative duty case), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W.
3325 (1990), with Eugene D. v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1989) (social workers who failed
to protect plaintiff-child from violence at the hands of a foster parent were entitled to qualified
immunity), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2631 (1990).
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protection statutes created an "entitlement" to receive protective serv-
ices. 4 The Court also noted that there was no allegation of discrimi-
natory enforcement of child abuse laws. 5 Finally, the Court flatly
suggested that the case might have been decided differently if it
involved a modestly different set of relationships, namely, if the state
had turned Joshua over to an abusive foster parent rather than
returning him to his father.2 6
Justice Brennan, in dissent, did not disagree so much with the gen-
eral framework of the majority opinion as with its application to the
facts of the case. Conceding that the due process clause does not cre-
ate a "general right to basic governmental services,"27 he concluded
that the extent of state involvement in Joshua's life warranted impos-
ing an affirmative duty. Specifically, Justice Brennan found that the
state did worsen Joshua's position by cutting off potential rescuers.
"Through its child welfare program... the State of Wisconsin has
relieved ordinary citizens and governmental bodies other than the
Department of any sense of obligation to do anything more than
report their suspicions of child abuse to DSS.' '2 Inaction in this con-
text "can be every bit as abusive of power as action."2 9 Justice Black-
mun, writing separately, posited that fourteenth amendment
precedents could be read broadly or narrowly to suit the desired end.
A "moral ambition," he declared, should have led the Court to recog-
nize an affimative duty toward Joshua.30
C. Evaluating the Court's Opinion
The opinion in DeShaney makes a halting start toward constructing
sensible principles for resolving affirmative duty claims. The Court
declares that "the Due Process Clause does not require the State to
provide its citizens with particular protective services,"'31 but offers no
persuasive justification for this ruling. As if to recognize the inade-
24. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003 n.2; see Doe v. Milwaukee County, 712 F. Supp. 1370 (E.D.
Wis. 1989) (holding that the Wisconsin statutes do not create an entitlement to protective
services), aff'd, 903 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1990). For an extended discussion of this theory of
recovery, see Comment, Actionable Inaction. Section 1983 Liability for Failure to Act, 53 U. CHi.
L. REv. 1048 (1986).
25. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004 n.3; see Lowers v. City of Streator, 627 F. Supp. 244, 246
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (alleging sexually discriminatory enforcement of laws in domestic violence
situations).
26. DeShaney, 109 U.S. at 1006 n.9.
27. Id. at 1007-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 1011 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 1012 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 1012 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 1004.
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quacy of this broad prohibition, the Court proceeds to qualify it by
acknowledging that the Constitution sometimes can be the source of
affirmative duties. But the Court's effort to describe those circum-
stances and explain what factors count in identifying them produces
more questions than answers.
1. Is the Constitution "A Charter of Negative Liberties"?
The most sweeping portions of the DeShaney opinion speak to the
case in which government officers have played no part in exposing the
plaintiff to danger. The Court unequivocally rejects the proposition
that the due process clause obligates state officials to protect individu-
als from attacks by private persons.32 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court relies on the language, history, and prior judicial construction of
the fourteenth amendment. The Court's analysis merits close scru-
tiny. None of these reasons, individually or collectively, provides an
adequate explanation for the rejection of a constitutional affirmative
duty. The Court's reliance on these tools of constitutional adjudica-
tion seems ill-advised, for language, history, and precedent yield only
fragmentary and contradictory guidance to the resolution of inaction
cases. They neither compel nor forbid the recognition of a constitu-
tional duty to act.
a. Language
According to the Court, "nothing in the language of the Due Pro-
cess Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and
property of its citizens against invasion by private actors."' 33 The
Court's hidden assumption is that the word "deprive" denotes only
positive acts. One accepted definition of this word, both today and in
late eighteenth century usage, however, is "to keep [a person from]
what he would otherwise have."3 4 Under this usage, one may be
"deprived" of valuable interests through inaction as well as action.
Thus, one could readily conclude that the state's inaction deprived
Joshua DeShaney of liberty without doing violence to the language of
the due process clause.35 It begs the question to say that the state did
not deprive Joshua of liberty because it did not act.
32. Id. at 1003.
33. Id.
34. 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 490 (2d ed. 1989); see also WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY 380 (2d College ed. 1986).
35. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (state unconstitutionally "deprives" a person
of welfare benefits when it withholds benefits to which he is legally entitled).
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Such quibbling over the meaning of the word "deprive" points up a
more general objection to relying exclusively on language to resolve
fundamental constitutional questions. Constitutional language, stand-
ing alone, is a notoriously unreliable guide to the Court's construction
of constitutional provisions, including the due process clause. 6 If the
literal language of the Constitution were dispositive, then only Con-
gress would be prohibited from abridging freedom of speech and reli-
gion.3 7 The first amendment says nothing about the actions of judges,
the President, or other government officials. Yet, it is abundantly
clear that the first amendment restrains all branches of government.38
In another vein, the Court has imposed constitutional limitations on
state regulation of interstate commerce, even though the Constitution
speaks only of Congress' authority "[t]o regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."39 The so-called negative implications of the commerce clause
cannot be fairly derived exclusively from constitutional language. It is
a doctrine born more of policy than constitutional language.' Yet
another example comes from the law of state sovereign immunity from
suit in federal court. The eleventh amendment prevents federal courts
from entertaining suits "prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."'" Neither the original Constitution nor the amendment says
anything about suits brought against a state by a citizen of that state.
Yet, the Court has long read them to immunize states from suit in
federal courts even where the suit is brought on federal law grounds by
one of the state's own citizens.42
36. We do not mean that one should interpret the Constitution as if it were "a poem."
Laycock, Constitutional Theory Matters, 65 TEx. L. Rnv. 767, 774 (1987). Language and text do
count. On some issues the Constitution speaks with such precision that there is no room or need
for interpretation; for example, the age prerequisite for the presidency. We recognize, however,
that many provisions of the Constitution are indeterminate. In giving content to open-ended
constitutional commands such as the due process or privileges and immunity clauses, judges will
necessarily make substantive choices. See generally, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 12-15 (2d ed. 1988); L. TRIBE, CONSTITUrIONAL CHOICES (1985).
37. The amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press. . ... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
38. See, ag., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (executive branch);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (judicial branch).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
40. See Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 429-35
(1982).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
42. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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The Court's treatment of the due process clause itself belies the con-
straining force it ascribes to constitutional language. The first eight
amendments to the Constitution restrain only the federal government.
With the ratification of the fourteenth amendment in 1868 came the
imposition of due process and equal protection restrictions on the
exercise of state authority. It was not until much later, however, that
some of the specific prohibitions contained in the Bill of Rights were
deemed applicable to the states. In a series of cases decided mainly in
the 1960's, the Court ruled that selective provisions of the Bill of
Rights were incorporated into the fourteenth amendment through the
due process clause.43
From the standpoint of linguistic precision, the due process clause is
the one section of the fourteenth amendment that plainly does not
incorporate part of the Bill of Rights. The due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment is modeled, word for word, on a clause in the
fifth amendment. The phrase "due process" in the fifth amendment
does not address free speech, search and seizure, or other restrictions
on governmental power found in other amendments. How then can
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment plausibly be
deemed to stand for the provisions of the first, fourth, sixth, and eighth
amendments, as well as other parts of the original fifth amendment?
While the fourteenth amendment may properly impose upon the states
some of the same limitations placed on the federal government by the
Bill of Rights,' it is surely not because the language of the due process
clause directs that result.
b. History
The Court's reliance on history to support its rejection of affirmative
constitutional duties also lacks persuasive force. The gist of the
Court's reasoning is that the fourteenth amendment was directed at
abuses of governmental power. From this observation the Court con-
cludes that the purpose of the due process clause "was to protect the
people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them
43. E.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
44. Many scholars suggest that the prohibitions on the exercise of federal power contained in
the Bill of Rights apply equally against the state under the privileges and immunities clause of
the fourteenth amendment. J. TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW, 236-39 (1965); L. TRIBE,
supra note 36, at 550. The Supreme Court greatly narrowed the reach of the privileges and
immunities clause in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The privileges
and immunities clause has been called "the almost forgotten ... clause." Colgate v. Harvey, 296
U.S. 404, 443 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds, Madden v. Kentucky,
309 U.S. 83 (1940).
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from each other."45 Judge Posner made a similar historical argument
in Jackson v. City of Joliet. I Pointing out that the fourteenth amend-
ment was adopted in 1868, "at the height of laissez-faire thinking," he
declared that the amendment "sought to protect Americans from
oppression by state government, not to secure them basic governmen-
tal services."'47
The historical record is not as unambiguous as Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Judge Posner suggest. The framers of the fourteenth amend-
ment and section 1983 were not so much captains of industry
enamored by free market capitalism as idealistic abolitionists who had
fought slavery for thirty years. The statute was originally known as
the Ku Klux Klan Act, because it was inspired by Klan violence
against blacks and their white supporters.4" In order to justify creat-
ing a new federal remedy for constitutional wrongs, its supporters had
to rebut the argument that it was an unnecessary incursion on state
authority because local law enforcement officers could maintain law
and order. Their response was to produce evidence of Klan terrorism
that had elicited no response from local sheriffs.49 Thus, the statute
"was aimed at least as much at the abdication of law enforcement
responsibilities by Southern officials as it was at the Klan's
outrages." 50
Moreover, there is affirmative evidence that the fourteenth amend-
ment was intended to recognize a state's obligation to protect its citi-
zens from harm. The privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State shall.., abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. ' 51 During
the debates over the fourteenth amendment, proponents explained the
meaning of this provision by quoting from Justice Bushrod Washing-
ton's 1823 opinion in Corfield v. Coryell.52 In his Corfield opinion,
Justice Washington explained the privileges and immunities clause of
article IV, section 2 of the Constitution. That section provides that
45. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1989).
46. 715 F.2d 1200 (1983), cerL denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
47. Id at 1203.
48. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-80 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v.
Department of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See generally Shapo,
Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. Rav. 277 (1965).
49. See Wells, The Past and the Future of Constitutional Torts: From Statutory Interpretation
to Common Law Rules, 19 CoNN. L. REv. 53, 66 & n.90 (1986).
50. Note, Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1133,
1154 (1977); see also Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the "Free World" of DeShaney, 57
GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 1513, 1524-25 (1989).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
52. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
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"[t]he citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states,""3 and inspired the four-
teenth amendment's broader guarantee. The very first right identified
by Justice Washington as a privilege of citizenship is the right to
"[p]rotection by the government."54 Senators Trumbull and Howard
quoted this passage from Corfield with approval when explaining their
understanding of the privileges and immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
55
Does the favorable quotation of Corfield by two influential senators
mean that the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended the Win-
nebago County Department of Social Services to protect Joshua
DeShaney as a matter of constitutional right? Of course not. As Wil-
liam Nelson explains in his recent book, "supporters of the Fourteenth
Amendment spent little time elaborating how it would apply to spe-
cific issues they faced."56 They "understood constitutional politics as
a rhetorical venture designed to persuade people to do good, rather
than a bureaucratic venture intended to establish precise legal rules
and enforcement mechanisms."57 Their task was perceived as a moral
one of proclaiming vague principles of civic reformation. Conse-
quently, it is futile to place too much reliance on the history of the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment in an effort to resolve specific
issues raised for the first time more than one hundred years after its
ratification. 8
Even if reliable information were available about the framers' intent,
we should be skeptical of the Court's suggestion in DeShaney that it
considers itself bound by such history. Longstanding practice casts
doubt on the Court's fidelity to the framers' intent as the basic stan-
dard of constitutional interpretation. The Court's narrow construc-
tion of the privileges and immunities clause in the Slaughter-House
Cases, 59 for example, was "flatly inconsistent with the history of its
framing in Congress and its ratification by the state legislatures."'
53. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
54. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551.
55. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (Jan. 29, 1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull); id.
at 2765 (May 23, 1866) (remarks of Sen. Howard); see W. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 81 (1988).
56. W. NELSON, supra note 55, at 9.
57. Id.
58. For a more complete discussion on the limitations of history as a basis of constitutional
interpretation, see Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv.
204 (1980); Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist
Interpretation Be Justified, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1482 (1985).
59. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
60. W. NELSON, supra note 55, at 163; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 548-53.
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There is also strong evidence that most of the framers of the four-
teenth amendment intended no bar on segregated public schools,61 yet
the Supreme Court has held that racial segregation violates the equal
protection clause.62
Opinions addressing the application of the Bill of Rights to the
states also reflect the court's selective reliance on history. Some schol-
ars argue that the framers of the fourteenth amendment meant to
"incorporate" the Bill of Rights into it, so that the rights to speech,
free exercise of religion, jury trial, and the rest, would apply against
state governments.63 Other historians dispute that thesis.64 Each side
marshalls historical evidence for its position.65 No one argues that the
framers meant to incorporate only selective portions of the Bill of
Rights. The historical evidence 66 all goes to the broad issue whether
the Bill of Rights should be applied, en bloc, to the states. Yet, the
Court's approach has been profoundly ahistorical. It has rejected both
sides of the historical debate in favor of "selective incorporation,"
picking and choosing among constitutional rights. The Court applies
the first, fourth, sixth and eighth amendments against the states, while
refusing to subject them to the grand jury clause of the fifth amend-
ment or the right to jury trial in civil cases guaranteed by the seventh
amendment. The Court's actual practice has no historical pedigree
whatsoever.67 These are but a few examples that support the belief
that one cannot accept at face value the Court's assertion that the
result in DeShaney follows from the history of the enactment of the
fourteenth amendment.
c. Precedent
The Court in DeShaney noted that "our cases have recognized that
the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to gov-
61. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 118-19 (1977); W. NELSON, supra note
55, at 133.
62. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
63. The most prominent proponent of this view was Justice Hugo Black. See, eg., Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds,
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
64. See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
65. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 424 n.2 (11th ed. 1985) ("Searches in the
origins of the [fourteenth] [a]mendment have been inconclusive.").
66. Compare the Appendix to Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California,
322 U.S. at 92-123, with Professor Fairman's review of the history of the fourteenth amendment,
supra note 64.
67. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 175-76, 180-81 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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ernmental aid.",6 1 In support of this proposition, the Court cited opin-
ions proclaiming that there is no fundamental right to adequate
housing,69 and that the government has no constitutional obligation to
fund abortions or other medical services. 70 These cases do indeed sup-
port the thesis that the Constitution is primarily a "charter of negative
liberties. ' 7 1 The abortion funding cases in particular draw a sharp dis-
tinction between governmental prohibitions and the obligation of gov-
ernment to assist an individual in exercising rights secured by the
Constitution.72
Other cases, however, find positive governmental obligations in vari-
ous constitutional provisions, including the due process clause. Schol-
ars have documented many instances in which the Supreme Court has
found in negatively phrased provisions constitutional duties that can
be described as positive in some sense.73 Besides the line of cases from
Estelle to Youngberg to Revere on duties owed to involuntarily con-
fined persons, note the obligation to provide counsel to indigent crimi-
nal defendants,74 the obligation to provide access to information,75 the
obligation to provide access to government facilities to engage in com-
municatative activity,76 and other arguably affirmative duties constitu-
tionally imposed on government.77 To the extent these rulings require
the state to act affirmatively they do so by reason of the same due
process clause the Court describes in restrictive terms in DeShaney.
One decision that strongly suggests that "due process" may involve
state protection is Truax v. Corrigan.71 This 1921 opinion involved an
employer's request for an injunction against picketing by striking
workers. The Court ruled that, by withdrawing the injunctive remedy,
the state had deprived the employer of property without due process
of law. The Court, in effect, read the due process clause to require the
state to protect the employer from acts of private parties. This, of
course, closely parallels the theory rejected in DeShaney.
68. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1989).
69. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
70. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
71. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
72. L. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 781-84.
73. Currie, supra note 7, at 872-86.
74. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
75. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1980).
76. See Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REV. 1287 (1979).
77. See Currie, supra note 7, at 872-86; see also Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 873, 888-91 (1987).
78. 257 U.S. 312 (1921). Cf Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1979)
(suggesting that the government is obligated to enforce trespass laws against private intruders to
avoid a "taking" of property).
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Lawrence Tribe proposes Boddie v. Connecticut79 as the progenitor
of the state's duty to rescue Joshua DeShaney from his father's
abuse."0 Boddie was a challenge by an indigent couple to the state's
filing fee for divorce. The Court invalidated the fee on the ground that
due process "does prohibit a State from denying, solely because of
inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial
dissolution of their marriages."8" Essentially, Boddie requires the
state to subsidize divorces of indigent persons because of the state's
control over the mechanisms for obtaining a divorce. In DeShaney the
Court might have focused on the parallel between Connecticut's
monopoly on the means for obtaining divorce and Wisconsin's deci-
sion to channel complaints about child abuse to social services agen-
cies. As a practical matter, the Winnebago County Department of
Social Services exercised as much control over Joshua's exposure to a
violent parent as the Connecticut courts had over divorce.8 2
Prior case law may not compel a different result in DeShaney, but
neither does it preclude it. David Currie warns that "it would be dan-
gerous to read too much, even at the theoretical level, into the gener-
ally valid principle that ours ... is a Constitution of negative rather
than positive liberties.",8 3 There are too many counter examples in
which the Court has imposed a positive constitutional obligation. Jus-
tice Blackmun was correct when he noted that the question presented
by Joshua's claim was "an open one. '84
2., How Much State Involvement Is Necessary?
DeShaney squarely rejects liability in constitutional tort when the
governmental defendant has no connection to the plaintiff other than
its ability to render aid. The defendants in DeShaney, however, were
not strangers to the events giving rise to Joshua's need for protection.
79. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
80. See Tribe, supra note 9, at 11-12.
81. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374.
82. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1011 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Brennan observed that:
[A] private citizen or even a person working in a government agency other than DSS, would
doubtless feel that her job was done as soon as she had reported her suspicions of child abuse
to DSS.... [T]he State of Wisconsin has relieved ordinary citizens and governmental bodies
other than the Department of any sense of obligation to do anything more than report their
suspicions of child abuse to DSS. If DSS ignores or dismisses these suspicions, no one will
step in to fill the gap.
Id
83. Currie, supra note 7, at 887. Currie also dismisses as "profoundly ahistorical" the notion
that the Constitution offers a positive right to basic welfare services. Id. at 878.
84. 109 S. Ct. at 1012 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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State officials had first taken custody of Joshua and then returned him
to the care of his father. Caseworkers monitored the situation and
determined whether Joshua should remain in the abusive environ-
ment. Reports of suspicious injuries were channeled to the defendants
pursuant to state law. Joshua argued that these facts coupled with his
need for protection were sufficient to create an affirmative duty in con-
stitutional tort based on a special relationship between himself and the
state.
The majority in DeShaney rejected this argument, but never ade-
quately explained why. Rather, Justice Rehnquist's opinion meanders
among three distinct alternatives, and appears not to recognize that
the three approaches might produce different results in future cases.
By not clearly differentiating among the three approaches, DeShaney
sends an ambiguous message that has already produced considerable
confusion in the lower courts.85
a. Involuntary Confinement
Justice Rehnquist began his consideration of state involvement by
acknowledging that the Constitution sometimes "imposes upon the
State affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to particu-
lar individuals."86 For this proposition he cited Estelle v. Gamble87
and Youngberg v. Romeo. 88 In Estelle, a prisoner claimed he received
inadequate medical attention and the Court said that "deliberate indif-
ference" to his needs would violate the eighth amendment's prohibi-
tion on cruel and unusual punishment.89 Youngberg applied this
principle under the doctrine of substantive due process to cover the
basic needs of persons involuntarily confined in mental institutions.9"
According to the Court these cases provided "no help" to Joshua,9 1
because the plaintiffs in both Estelle and Youngberg were persons con-
fined by the state against their will. The rationale of those cases was
that "when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so
restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for
himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human
needs ... it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by
85. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
86. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004-05.
87. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
88. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
89. 429 U.S. at 104.
90. 457 U.S. at 314-25.
91. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1005 (1989).
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the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause."92 Had the
Chief Justice stopped there, the opinion would stand for the broad
principle that the state owes affirmative duties only to those it involun-
tarily confines. Some early commentary on DeShaney has, too hastily
in our view, adopted this very expansive reading of the case.93
b. Analogies toConfinement
The Court, however, felt compelled to go further. Evidently unsat-
isfied with an involuntary confinement rule, Chief Justice Rehnquist
added that the case might come out differently had the state not
returned Joshua to his father but instead placed him in a foster home.
On these facts, the Court explained, "we might have a situation suffi-
ciently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to
an affirmative duty to protect."94 The Court's disposition of then-
pending affirmative duty cases indicates that this suggestion must be
taken seriously. In two cases, the Court followed its routine practice
of vacating the lower court's judgments and remanding the cases for
reconsideration in light of DeShaney.95 A third case, Taylor v. Ledbet-
ter,96 presented the constitutional tort claim of a child beaten by his
foster parent. The Eleventh Circuit had affirmed an award in favor of
the child based on social workers' failure to protect him. The Court
denied certiorari, thus allowing the circuit court's ruling to stand. The
"sufficiently analogous" language in DeShaney and the denial of certi-
orari in Ledbetter suggest the Court may not mean to limit the protec-
tive scope of affirmative duties to involuntarily confined plaintiffs.
Others whose circumstances are similar to confinement, in some as yet
undefined way, may benefit from a constitutionally grounded affirma-
tive duty of protection.97
92. Id. at 1005-06.
93. Burnham, Separating Constitutional and Common-Law Torts: A Critique and a Proposed
Constitutional Theory of Duty, 73 MiNN. L. REV. 515, 570 n.219 (1989); Oren, The State's
'Failure to Protect Children and Substantive Due Process DeShaney in Context, 68 N.C.L. REv.
659, 662-63 (1990); Soifer, supra note 9, at 1527; Strauss, supra note 9, at 55; Note, Section 1983
and Domestic Violence: A Solution to the Problem of Police Officers' Inaction, 30 B.C.L. REv.
1357, 1371 (1989).
94. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006 n.9.
95. Smith v. Stoneking, 856 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1989), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 1333 (1989); City of
New Kensington v. Horton, 857 F.2d 1464 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 1334 (1989).
96. 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989); see also K.H. v.
Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (1990) (state officials owe a constitutional duty to protect a child placed in
a foster home).
97. The Supreme Court's message remains ambiguous. The Court recently denied certiorari
to a Fourth Circuit case holding that government welfare officials were not to be held responsible
for the abusive acts of a state approved foster parent with whom a child had been voluntarily
placed. Milburn v. Anne Arundel Dep't. of Social Servs., 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir.), cert denied,
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c. Special Relationships
The Court's discussion of circumstances that may give rise to a duty
to act did not end with confinement and its analogues. The Court
offered a third, and much narrower, ground for denying relief. It
emphasized that the state "played no part" in creating the dangers
Joshua faced, did nothing "to render him any more vulnerable to
them," and left him "in no worse position than that in which he would
have been had it not acted at all." 98 This suggests that if the state
contributes in some way to a person's peril, or if its undertakings
worsen the plaintiff's position, a constitutional duty to act might arise.
The state may create danger or render a person more vulnerable with-
out constraining him in any way. Familiar examples include the
release of a criminal known to be dangerous without warning potential
victims, or inducing someone to rely on state protection and then fail-
ing to provide it. The Court's third approach to justifying its denial of
relief to Joshua DeShaney leaves ample room to recognize a constitu-
tional duty in either such case.
The Court's failure to clearly identify what type of state involve-
ment will give rise to an affirmative duty has already produced confu-
sion. Since DeShaney, several lower courts have suggested that the
state is constitutionally obligated to protect only those it involuntarily
confines. 99 Other courts continue to recognize affirmative duties in
110 S. Ct. 148 (1989). The Fourth Circuit based its ruling on the alleged absence of state action.
The court drew support from Supreme Court decisions finding that private action adversely
affecting liberty or property interests is not subject to the demands of procedural due process,
notwithstanding some involvement of the state. E.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982);
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 US. 830 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345
(1974). The Fourth Circuit reasoned that since the foster parent of a voluntarily placed infant
was not a state actor, child welfare authorities were not legally responsible for preventing the
abuse. Milburn, 871 F.2d at 479. The state action cases are only marginally relevant to the
recognition of affirmative duty in constitutional tort. On a superficial level, both lines of cases
often present questions of whether the state bears any responsibility for the conduct of a
nominally private actor. On closer examination, however, the two lines of cases raise distinctly
different issues. The affirmative duty cases raise the question of whether the state owes an
obligation to protect the plaintiff from some peril-not whether the peril itself can be said to be
that of the state.
98. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006.
99. E.g., J.O. v. Alton Community Unit School Dist. No. 11, 909 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1990) (no
duty to protect school children from sexually abusive teacher); Milburn, 871 F.2d at 478 n.2
(distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary foster home placements); Philadelphia Police
& Fire Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 156, 168 (3d Cir. 1989) (affirmative duties under
DeShaney must be predicated upon the state's "act of restraining the individual's freedom to act
on his own behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint on
personal liberty"); Dean v. D. Raucci, No. 87-C-7697 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (no duty to protect complaining witness who voluntarily accompanies
investigating officer into a suspect's apartment); McPeak v. City of Philadelphia, No. 88-6716
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noncustodial settings.lc° The paramount affirmative duty issue facing
both the Supreme Court and the lower courts in the aftermath of
DeShaney is to determine what kinds of governmental contributions to
the plaintiff's predicament will trigger the guarantees of the due pro-
cess clause. To this issue we now turn.
II. FOUNDATIONS FOR A REVISED DOCTRINE
The gaps in the Court's DeShaney opinion stem from its failure to
recognize the fundamental value choices raised by affirmative duty
claims in constitutional tort. The Court's focus on constitutional lan-
guage and its superficial citation to precedent reflect reluctance to
address questions of constitutional principle and tort policy that must
be resolved in reaching wise decisions in this field of law. In terms of
tort policy, it is necessary to take account of conflicting demands for
public resources and of the need to maintain leeway for officials to
exercise their judgment. In addition, because these cases are of consti-
tutional dimension, the Court also must consider the special features
of constitutional rules. While due process clause does not provide a
remedy for every injury caused by government, properly construed it
should protect persons from abuses of governmental power.
A. Tort Policy and Affirmative Duty
The argument for recognizing a government's duty to aid its citizens
is straightforward. The imposition of an affirmative duty subjects the
passive official to potential tort liability. Exposure to liability provides
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (no duty to protect criminal defendant
who jumped out of courtroom window since he was on bail and not in defendant's custody); see
also sources cited supra note 93.
100. Eg., Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510 (7th Cir. 1990) (duty to protect citizen
from former policeman who was permitted to retain his gun despite being placed on the medical
roll as mentally unfit for duty); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1990) (police chief
who refused to enforce a restraining order may be held liable in constitutional tort for injuries
inflicted by the chief's friend); Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1989) (policy of
relegating law enforcement in private clubs to proprietor may be the cause of the plaintiff's
injury); Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989) (duty to protect
town clerk from inmates assigned to community work squad implied when court reversed trial
court's order granting state's motion for summary judgment, finding existence of duty a triable
question), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1784 (1990); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989)
(duty to protect passenger left stranded by police in high crime area implied when court reversed
trial court's order granting defendant's summary judgment motion), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W.
3325 (1990); G-69 v. Degnan, 745 F. Supp. 254 (D.N.J. 1990) (duty to protect undercover
informant enrolled in government program); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(duty owed to 15,000 children in the legal, but not physical, custody of the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services); Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Schools, 714 F. Supp. 641
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (duty to protect elementary school pupil).
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an incentive to act. So long as the costs of protection are less than the
potential liability, the rational official will act to protect the person in
peril. Encouraging cost effective protective action would reduce the
overall injury costs to society and eliminate some harms to some indi-
viduals. 0 1 The duty to act can also be defended in terms of reinforc-
ing widely shared understandings of the proper role of government.
Most people would think it "wrong" for a police officer to passively
observe a citizen being robbed or beaten. Imposing an affirmative duty
in such a case vindicates the plaintiff's expectations of protection and
provides a means for redressing the wrong.'02
Despite these considerations, courts remain cautious in recognizing
common law tort affirmative duties for public officials. 103 The ensuing
discussion identifies several policy considerations that counsel against
imposing widespread affirmative duties.
1. Discretionary Allocation of Public Resources
Before the Supreme Court's ruling in DeShaney, several lower court
opinions explained the judicial reluctance to recognize affirmative con-
stitutional tort duties in terms of preserving legislative and executive
discretion. Government is a complex enterprise in which hard choices
must be made as to how best to deploy limited resources. Money
spent on better police or fire protection may have to be taken away
from the budget for schools or providing shelter for the homeless.
Since "[t]his choice is one without a single right answer," it is "one for
the political rather than the judicial branches."'" In short, good gov-
ernment requires the exercise of legislative and executive discretion in
deciding how to use limited resources. This rationale for rejecting
affirmative duties is concerned with the distribution of power within
government. It reflects a confidence that the legislative and executive
branches can properly define the obligations of government and allo-
cate resources to achieve public goals. Judicial intervention through
101. The deterrent function of tort law is elaborately explicated in the law and economics
literature. See generally G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970); Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REv.
851 (1981).
102. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 653-55 (1980). Tort law traditionally
defines legal rights, provides a means for vindicating those rights, and compensates those whose
rights have been violated. See generally AM. BAR ASS'N, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF
INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN
TORT LAW ch. 3-4 (1984); 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 11.5
(1986).
103. See Wells & Eaton, supra note 7, at 3-13.
104. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1221 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied 109 S. Ct.
1338 (1989).
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the imposition of constitutional tort liability would disrupt the balance
of competing interests achieved through the democratic political
process.
In evaluating this argument, it bears noting that there is nothing
distinctly constitutional about a judicial policy favoring the preserva-
tion of executive and legislative discretion. Many decisions under
state tort law have rejected the imposition of affirmative duties on gov-
ernments for the same reason. The "public duty doctrine"10 5 of state
tort law is predicated upon the belief that the politically responsive
branches of government should determine the mix of goals to pursue
and how to spend public resources in pursuit of those goals. As
explained in the classic case of Riss v. City of New York-
For the courts to proclaim a new and general duty of protection based
on specific hazards, could and would inevitably determine how the lim-
ited police resources of the community should be allocated and without
predictable limits.'0 6
Judicial deference to the other branches of government also appears
in affirmative duty cases brought against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act."0 7 The discretionary function exception to
the Act 108 is designed to "prevent judicial 'second guessing' of legisla-
tive and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and
political policy through the medium of an action in tort."'1 9 The
scope of discretion appropriately insulated from judicial second guess-
ing is a matter of considerable controversy.110 The discretionary func-
tion exception has been invoked to deny recovery in affirmative duty
105. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 1049 (5th ed. 1984).
106. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 860-61, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968). Linda Riss
repeatedly asked the police to protect her from a rejected lover who threatened to injure her if
she married another man. The threats were carried out by a hired thug who threw lye in her
face. The court dismissed her tort suit, holding that the city had no duty to protect her from the
attack.
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988) (permitting tort suits against the United States "under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred").
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (excepting from the coverage of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) claims "based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty... whether or not the discretion involved be abused").
109. United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viaeao Aerea Rio Grandense Varig Airlines, 467 U.S.
797, 814 (1984).
110. See Fishback & Killefer, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act: Dalehite to Varig to Berkovitz 25 IDAHO L. REV. 291 (1988-1989); James, The
Federal Tort Claims Act and the "Discretionary Function" Exception: The Sluggish Retreat of an
Ancient Immunity, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 184 (1957).
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cases involving the protection of witnesses,11' prison inmates, 1' 2
jurors,' 13 and property owners.'14
DeShaney may be understood in terms of traditional tort doctrine
that respects executive and legislative discretion in setting broad pol-
icy. By rejecting Joshua's constitutional tort claim, the Court deferred
to the State of Wisconsin's judgment as to how best to respond to the
delicate social problem of child abuse. Partisans of giving leeway to
the executive and legislature do not assert that officials will always
make wise choices. They maintain that bad decisions may be cor-
rected through the political process or by common law rules subject to
state legislative oversight.
The argument for policy-making discretion is not without force.
The judicial process is hardly suited to the task of setting governmen-
tal policy, nor is it appropriate in a democracy to place so much power
in the hands of politically unaccountable judges. Notice, however,
that the strength of the argument varies from one context to another,
depending on the particularity of the decision at issue. It is strongest
when contemplating judicial interference in general decisions by the
legislature or executive on how to allocate resources among the
departments of government. It is weakest in situations where courts
are asked to impose liability on executive officers faced with specific
facts, like the policeman who watches from his patrol car as the plain-
tiff is beaten or the social services worker who knows a parent is abus-
ing a child under her supervision. Judicial interference in this kind of
decision will have only minor impact on the ability of legislative and
executive officers to set governmental policy.
2. Operational Discretion and Tough Choices
Some decisions rejecting affirmative duties emphasize the need to
preserve discretion on an operational level. The relationship between
operational discretion and affirmative duty implicates the values of
fairness to officials and efficiency in the day-to-day administration of
government. One sympathizes with the police officer or social worker
called upon to make difficult decisions under the excitement of the
moment. In DeShaney, for example, the Court viewed county child
111. Piechowicz v. United States, 885 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989). But see Miller v. United
States, 561 F. Supp. 1129 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (duty to protect an informant), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1148
(3d Cir. 1984).
112. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963).
113. Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967).
114. Monarch Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia, 353 F. Supp. 1249, 1256-58 (D.D.C. 1973),
aff'd mem., 497 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974).
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welfare authorities as being trapped between the proverbial rock and a
hard place. "[M]ad they moved too soon to take custody of the son
away from the father, they would likely have been met with charges of
improperly intruding into the parent-child relationship, charges based
on the same Due Process Clause that forms the basis for the present
charge of failure to provide adequate protection."'1 15 The government
officials must either act or not act, and either decision may subject
them to liability.' 16 The harshness of this choice may be unfair to the
individual official. 117 This argument also has an instrumental dimen-
sion. Faced with the prospect of tort liability for their errors, officials
may become too cautious. Hence, expanding the scope of constitu-
tional duty may impede the efficient operation of government.'
While these concerns are legitimate, they do not justify the rejection
of affirmative duties. In the first place, a court need not deny the exist-
ence of an affirmative duty to alleviate the dilemma facing the state
official. Relief from liability is provided through the doctrine of quali-
fied immunity. Officials cannot be held personally liable in constitu-
tional tort unless their decisions violate "clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.""' 9 Thus, qualified immunity should protect all officials who
are forced to make the truly hard choice. More importantly, the
denial of affirmative duties skews the decision-making process by cre-
ating incentives for inaction. Before and after DeShaney, the decision
to remove a child from a home could lead to liability, subject to the
defense of qualified immunity.'20 After DeShaney, the decision to do
nothing is beyond challenge in constitutional tort. DeShaney tells the
social worker that it is safer from a standpoint of personal liability to
115. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1007 (1989).
116. Cf K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 853 (1990) ("[W]e do not want to place child welfare
workers on a razor's edge-damned if they return the child to its family and damned if they
retain custody of the child .... ); see also Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 512 (7th Cir.)
(rejecting suit by prison guards against their superiors for inadequate protection from prisoners,
partly because greater efforts to protect the guards may lead to suits by prisoners), cert denied,
479 U.S. 994 (1986).
117. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
118. See, eg., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). For a detailed treatment of the
problem of "overdeterrence" of government officials, see Cass, Damage Suits Against Public
Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1110, 1133-74 (1981).
119. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987).
Furthermore, the denial of a defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity sometimes can be appealed immediately, so that the official may not even have to stand
trial. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). See generally Kinports, Qualified Immunity in
Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. REv. 597 (1989).
120. See eg., Eugene D. v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
2631 (1990); Lux ex reL Lux v. Hansen, 886 F.2d 1064, 1066-67 (8th Cir. 1989); Achterhof v.
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leave an endangered child in the home than to attempt to remove him.
The decision-making process would be more balanced if the risk of
personal liability did not depend on the characterization of the deci-
sion as an act or omission. In short, the blanket rejection of affirma-
tive duties is neither an essential nor a prudent way of preserving
operational discretion.
3. Fear of the Slippery Slope
Some judges fear that any recognition of affirmative duties will inex-
orably lead to a dangerous expansion of the role of government in our
lives. In Jackson v. City of Joliet, 121 the court held that a police officer
who happens upon an automobile accident owes no duty to look for or
rescue a person trapped in the car. In his opinion, Judge Posner
explained that if this plaintiff were successful, "[t]he next case ... will
be one where the police and fire departments, maybe because of budget
cuts, do not arrive at the scene of the accident at all." The ultimate
logic of the plaintiff's argument, Judge Posner concludes, leads to a
general constitutional "duty to provide basic services." 122 These
passages reflect the concern that imposing any affirmative duty on
state officials is the first step down the "slippery slope" towards the
evils of big government.
One should approach slippery slope arguments with caution. Most
statements of legal principle may be criticized on slippery slope
grounds. Recognition of any duty under the fourteenth amendment,
for example, creates a danger that courts will extend the scope of that
duty to an inappropriate case. The risk of tumbling down such a slip-
pery slope, however, does not justify judicial refusal to recognize any
fourteenth amendment rights.
In addition, the implicit premise of the slippery slope is that there is
nothing wrong in the "first step," other than it will lead to bad out-
Selvaggiuo, 886 F.2d 826, 829-30 (6th Cir. 1989); Doe v. Bobbitt, 881 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2560 (1990).
Other recent cases have held that decisions of child welfare workers whether or not to remove
a child from the home are prosecutorial in nature, and hence social workers should receive
absolute immunity when making these decisions. See, e.g., Salyer v. Patrick, 874 F.2d 374,
377-78 (6th Cir. 1989); Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1118 (1990); Vosburg v. Department of Social Servs., 884 F.2d 133, 135 (4th Cir. 1989);
Coverdell v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1987). If this
view gained widespread support, children in Joshua's position would have no remedy even if
governmental inaction states a constitutional violation.
121. 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
122. Id. at 1204; see also Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988) (en
banc) (rejecting an affirmative duty claim and warning of the dangers of "increases in the role of
government in society"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989).
132
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comes in future cases. 123 The slippery slope argument ultimately rests
on a pessimistic view of the ability of judges and juries to make linguis-
tic and conceptual distinctions. 124 Judge Posner declines to impose an
obligation on the on-the-scene police officer to rescue the trapped
automobile accident victim, not necessarily because liability would be
inappropriate in this case, but because future judges and jurors might
not be able to articulate and apply the distinctions necessary to avoid
recognizing a general governmental duty to provide basic services. 125
He is willing to sacrifice the benefits that would accompany a require-
ment that government actors help persons in danger even when policy-
making discretion is not at issue.
Finally, the slippery slope attack seems particularly inapposite to
recognizing affirmative duties, There exists in the lower federal courts
an increasingly well defined body of case law identifying the relevant
considerations and distinctions bearing on constitutional liability for
nonfeasance. This case law, discussed in detail below, 26 provides
guideposts sufficiently determinate to avoid such horribles as the con-
stitutionalizing of basic government services.
B. Constitutional Considerations
If the affirmative duty question were strictly a matter of tort policy,
the problem would come down to ranking and accommodating two
competing values. One is the need to give officials leeway in the
deployment of scarce governmental resources. The other is the tort
plaintiff's interest in recovering damages for the failure to help him,
which in turn rests on the familiar tort policies of encouraging safety
precautions and compensating victims of wrongdoing. These are
issues for common law courts and state legislatures, with significant
differences among states in the protection accorded the victim's inter-
ests. 27 Joshua DeShaney, and many other plaintiffs, seek to litigate
these cases in a different forum. They assert that the state official's
failure to help is not merely a state law tort but a violation of their
constitutional rights. To deal with this theory of liability, courts must
123. Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv. L. REv. 361, 368-69 (1985).
124. Id. at 370-71.
125. Professor Schauer distinguishes the slippery slope argument from "the argument against
the instant case"--one in which the initial step itself is bad, even if no "slide" down the slope
were to occur. Id. at 365. It may be that courts predicting bad outcomes of future cases if an
affirmative duty is recognized in this case also feel the outcome in this case is bad standing alone.
If so, the slippery slope argument adds nothing to the analysis. City of Joliet may be such an
opinion.
126. See infra section III.A.
127. See Wells & Eaton, supra note 7, at 3-13.
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look beyond tort policy and consider the special issues raised by the
constitutional nature of the claimed wrong.
1. The Perceived Dangers of Constitutionalizing Tort Claims
Why should Joshua, or any other plaintiff with similar injuries, be
permitted to proceed in federal court claiming a constitutional viola-
tion, when state tort remedies may be available?' 28 One practical
answer is that the state tort remedy may be unavailable or inadequate
to compensate for the loss. In Joshua's case, for example, a Wisconsin
Court might deny a tort claim by characterizing the caseworker's deci-
sion not to intervene as discretionary.12 9 Even if the claim was not
barred on this ground, a Wisconsin statute places a $50,000 ceiling on
tort recovery against governmental subdivisions or agencies. 1 30 This
limited recovery would not fully compensate the plaintiff for his loss.
Focusing on the adequacy of the state remedy, however, only side-
steps the more fundamental objection to authorizing constitutional
tort suits like Joshua's. Why not let the state limit or deny recovery?
In a representative democracy like our own, the legislature is primar-
ily responsible for deciding the scope of legal rights and obligations.
Why should some harms be accorded constitutional status so that the
legislature loses its power to define their legal consequences?
1 31
Any answer to this question must begin with the landmark decision
Monroe v. Pape. 132 In Monroe, policemen broke into the plaintiffs'
home, forced them to disrobe and stand naked, and then ransacked the
house. These wrongs could be characterized as unreasonable searches
and seizures, or described in terms of common law trespass, assault
128. See, e.g., Ebarb v. Stanislaus Co., 246 Cal. Rptr. 845 (Cal. Ct. App.) ordered not to be
officially published, 254 Cal. Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940 (Cal. 1988); Sorichetti v. City of New York,
65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985).
129. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.80(4) (West 1983); C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 422
N.W.2d 614 (1988) (decision to give paroled sex offender the use of a car was discretionary and
therefore not actionable).
130. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.80(3) (West 1983).
131. Cf DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989). The
DeShaney court stated:
[If] the people of Wisconsin... prefer a system of liability which would place upon the State
... the responsibility for failure to act in situations such as the present one ... [t]hey may
create such a system... by changing the tort law of the State in accordance with the regular
law-making process. But they should not have it thrust upon them by this Court's
expansion of the Due Process Clause ....
Id. at 1007; Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1205 (7th Cir. 1983) (no constitutional tort
remedy needed because political accountability of local officials will provide sufficient incentives
against incompetence in rescuing accident victims).
132. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Servs.
of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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and battery, and false imprisonment. Relying on this fact, the defend-
ants argued that the plaintiffs should be limited to their remedies
under Illinois tort law. The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court
concluded that any constitutional claim remediable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 was supplementary to any remedy available under state law.133
Since Monroe, plaintiffs commonly file their suits in federal court,
pleading both a constitutional tort and a pendent state tort claim.134
An overlap between state and constitutional tort is both anticipated
and accepted.
Monroe, however, was only the first in a long line of Supreme Court
opinions purporting to define the boundary separating constitutional
from common law torts. Many of these decisions evidence the Court's
determination to avoid transforming all government inflicted injuries
into constitutional torts. In Paul v. Davis, 135 for example, the Court
turned aside a claim that defamation by a state officer is a deprivation
of a constitutionally protected liberty. The fourteenth amendment,
the Court declared, is not "a font of tort law to be superimposed upon
whatever systems may already be administered by the States. ' 136 This
theme reappeared in Daniels v. Williams, 37 where the Court rejected
the constitutional tort claim of a prisoner who slipped and fell on a
negligently misplaced pillow. The opinion emphasizes that the consti-
tution "does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying
down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend liv-
ing together in society."' 38 Most recently, in DeShaney,, the Court
reaffirmed that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.., does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into
a constitutional violation." '39 The Court has reiterated this maxim, in
133. "It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal
remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused
before the federal one is invoked." Id. at 183.
134. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), permits plaintiffs with federal
claims to assert a state law theory of recovery in their federal suits, provided the federal and state
claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts. See, eg., Lux ex ret Lux v. Hansen, 886
F.2d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 1989); Chonich v. Wayne County Community College, 874 F.2d 359,
362 (6th Cir. 1989); Murray v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 874 F.2d 555, 557-58 (8th Cir. 1989); cf.
Rodriguez v. Comas, 875 F.2d 979, 983-85 (1st Cir. 1989) (pendent party jurisdiction),
withdrawn and republished at 888 F.2d 899 (Ist Cir. 1989).
135. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
136. Id. at 701.
137. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
138. Id. at 332.
139. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1007 (1989).
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one formulation or another, on no fewer than eight occasions over the
past thirteen years.'4°
Opinions like Paul and DeShaney reflect the Court's uneasiness with
invoking the Constitution--especially the due process clause-as a
source of tort recovery. The Court's concern stems partly from the
difficulty in modifying constitutional tort rules through the political
process. Because conflicting state laws must yield to controlling con-
stitutional provisions, state courts and legislatures are powerless to
alter constitutional tort rules or immunize governmental defendants.
For example, Wisconsin's statutory damage cap would not limit
Joshua's recovery in a section 1983 suit. 4 ' Constitutional tort rules
thus provide plaintiffs with greater protection, but are less flexible than
their common law counterparts.
The rigid character of constitutional rules may bolster the tort-
based policy arguments identified in the preceding section as undercut-
ting the recognition of affirmative duty claims. Had the Court in
DeShaney recognized an affirmative constitutional tort duty to protect
Joshua, county welfare officials could only turn to Congress for
relief."42 The same rule adopted as a matter of state tort law, in con-
trast, could be modified by state courts or the state legislature. Thus,
the recognition of affirmative constitutional duties would exact a
greater toll on state legislative and executive policy-making discretion
than would the recognition of similar duties under state tort law. The
rigidity of constitutional tort rules may also exacerbate the perceived
dangers of the slippery slope. The fear that affirmative duty rules will
lead to unlimited governmental obligations becomes more urgent
when missteps cannot be readily corrected in the political arena.
When the constitutional tort claim rests on a specific provision of
the Bill of Rights, the displacement of state tort law 43 necessarily is
limited to the particular subjects addressed by that constitutional pro-
140. See id.; Daniels v. Williams, 474 at 665; Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48
(1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285
(1980); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672
(1977); Paul, 424 U.S. at 698-99.
141. See Martinez, 444 U.S. at 284 & n.8.
142. Whether Congress may deny a damages remedy to someone proving a violation of his
constitutional rights remains an open issue. Cf. Wells, The Past and the Future of Constitutional
Torts, 19 CoNN. L. REv. 53, 76 n. 132 (1986) (discussing Congress's power to repudiate judicially
created causes of action for damages resulting from constitutional violations).
143. For a discussion of the "costs" of federal displacement of state tort law, see Whitman,
Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5, 30-40 (1980). But cf Beermann, Government Official
Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism and State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U.L. REv. 277,
326 (1988) (arguing that "[t]he fear that the fourteenth amendment might displace state tort law
is groundless").
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vision. Thus, Monroe opened the door to constitutionalizing tort
claims only to the extent the defendants' conduct could be character-
ized as an unreasonable search and seizure. When, as in DeShaney,
the claim rests solely on the open-ended language of the due process
clause, the potential for displacement of state law increases signifi-
cantly because any harm in which the government plays a role might
be called a deprivation of life, liberty, or property.
A related point is that the constitutional basis for affirmative duty
tort claims is somewhat controversial. Although the Court continues
to recognize substantive due process as a viable constitutional theory
of relief, critics point out that the due process clause by its terms sup-
ports only procedural, not substantive, restrictions on the exercise of
governmental power. 1" The inherently nebulous character of sub-
stantive due process "invests judges with an uncanalized discretion to
invalidate federal and state legislation." '145 For these reasons, critics
may assert that constitutional tort claims grounded in substantive due
process are potentially more offensive to federalism and separation of
power concerns than claims based on more textually explicit provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights. 1"
2. Due Process and Constitutional Tort
Given the longstanding concern with substantive due process in
general, and the troublesome relationship between substantive due
process and state tort law in particular, one might expect the Court to
eschew substantive due process doctrine altogether, at least in the con-
text of constitutional tort. Significantly, the Court has not done so. It
has never issued a blanket prohibition against treating substantive dep-
rivations of life, liberty or property as constitutional torts. Rather, its
opinions establish only that the circumstances of particular cases do
not amount to unconstitutional deprivations of life, liberty, or prop-
erty. The governmental conduct may be "too remote" to the loss of
life, 47 or the defendant may lack a sufficiently culpable state of
mind 4' to support liability. More recently, the Court has sought out
alternative constitutional bases for claims previously analyzed in terms
of substantive due process. For example, suits alleging use of excessive
144. See, eg., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 14-21 (1980).
145. Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 1988).
146. See, eg., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 511-13 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
147. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980).
148. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-33 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344,
347-48 (1986).
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force are now evaluated in terms of the more specific provisions of the
eighth and fourth amendments rather than the more general due pro-
cess clause. 149
Notwithstanding these efforts to restrict the scope of the due process
clause as a source of constitutional tort duties, the Court remains
faithful to the proposition that the clause does embody substantive
limitations on egregious government conduct. The Court has declared
unequivocally that unjustified physical injury affronts the "liberty"
protected by the due process clause.' 5° It has also held, and reaffirmed
in DeShaney, that the mistreatment of institutionalized persons
through inaction may violate substantive due process.' 5 ' In a similar
vein, the Court in Daniels v. Williams'12 ruled that negligently
inflicted physical injury did not amount to the kind of "abuse of
power" at which the due process clause was directed.' 53 The Court
expressly left open the issue of "whether something less than inten-
tional conduct, such as recklessness or gross negligence, is enough to
trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause."' 54 This locution
acknowledges that some forms of official misconduct resulting in per-
sonal injury are violations of due process, including at least "inten-
tional misconduct", and perhaps even "recklessness" or "gross
negligence" as well. Daniels explains that "by barring certain govern-
ment actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to imple-
ment them . . . [substantive due process] serves to prevent
governmental power from being 'used for purposes of oppression.' "'55
Why would the Court continue to embrace, albeit reluctantly, a
doctrine as controversial as substantive due process? The answer lies
in basic elements of constitutional theory. Many governmental deci-
sions designed to meet utilitarian ends hurt individuals in one way or
149. Brower v. County of Inyo, 109 S. Ct. 1378, 1380-81 (1989); Graham v. Connor, 109 S.
Ct. 1865, 1870-71 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985); Reed v. Hoy, 891 F.2d
1421, 1426 (9th Cir. 1989).
150. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-74 (1977).
151. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1004-05 (1989)
(citing City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239 (1983), and Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)); see also West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (preferring to analyze claim against a prison doctor under the rubric of substantive
due process). The Court recently expressed "no doubt" that prison inmates possess "a significant
liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1036
(1990). The state's policy at issue was found to satisfy substantive due process requirements. Id.
at 1039-40.
152. 474 U.S. 327, 332-33 (1986).
153. Id. at 332-33.
154. Id. at 334 n.3.
155. Id. at 331.
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another. For most of these harms no redress is available in the courts.
We accept that individual interests must often give way to the good of
the group, and leave the choice of collective goals and the means of
implementing them to the legislature and other officials accountable at
the ballot box.
Even so, political constraints are not the only limitation on the
power of government officials. Constitutional liberties are predicated
on the proposition that some individual rights are too vital to be left to
political checks alone. One theme of the Court's substantive due pro-
cess jurisprudence is that, quite apart from the specifics of the first
eight amendments, people have the right to be free from the arbitrary
exercise of governmental powers, and that this right embraces more
than the procedures to be followed before punishing or otherwise
inflicting harm on someone.
The Court has never set forth a definitive statement of this right. Its
opinions speak in terms of "fundamental rights" and "fundamental
fairness." Commentators characterize the cases as recognizing a right
of "personhood" or "autonomy""5 6 or "concern and respect." '57
Whatever the appropriate terminology, the Court in a variety of con-
texts has, under the rubric of due process, established boundaries on
permissible government action.
Thus, it lies beyond the legitimate authority of government to pro-
hibit the teaching of foreign languages,15 8 to prohibit parents from
sending their children to private schools,"5 9 to involuntarily sterilize
convicted felons, 6 ° and to prohibit a grandmother from living in the
same residence with her son and two grandchildren.' 6' Nor may the
state infringe on an individual's procreative liberty by banning the sale
of contraceptives 62 or prohibiting first trimester abortions. 63 Nor
may it revoke someone's probation because she is too poor to pay a
fine,' 64 or refuse to permit her to obtain a divorce because she cannot
afford the filing fee. 165
156. See L. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 1304.
157. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 273 (1977); see Wells & Eaton, supra note
5, at 230.
158. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
159. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 310 (1925).
160. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
161. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
162. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
163. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
164. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
165. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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The relevance of the substantive strain of due process doctrine to
personal injuries brought about by government abuse is also firmly
established. In Rochin v. California 166 the forced stomach pumping of
a criminal suspect was found to deny due process, because the practice
"shocks the conscience" 16 7 and "offends those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice of English speaking peo-
ples."1 68 Youngberg v. Romeo 169 declares that due process requires
the state to protect and care for involuntarily-committed mental
patients, 170 and Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital 171 obliges
states to provide medical care for pretrial detainees.1 72 Daniels v. Wil-
liams, in explaining why negligence is not enough to make out a con-
stitutional case, points out that the aim of the due process clause is "to
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government." 1
73
The theme connecting these various evocations of substantive due
process is the insistence that government officials show respect for per-
sons. In our political system, government is not an entity separate
from and above the people subject to its authority, like the Roman
emperors or the Bourbon kings of France. Rather, the function of
government in a liberal democracy is to serve the welfare of the citi-
zenry. 174 Government must recognize the worth of the human beings
in its charge and show some modicum of concern for their well-being.
It follows that the apparent convergence between common law torts
and constitutional torts is deceptive. The critical difference between
the two does not lie in the nature of the plaintiff's injury, but in the
abuse of government power. Moreover, what is abusive hinges on the
government official's state of mind. Suppose that two plaintiffs each
suffer bruises. One is involved in a collision with a negligently driven
state car, the other a high school student paddled by the school princi-
pal. Suppose further that the spanking was motivated by malice
rather than a need to maintain discipline, or was grossly dispropor-
tionate to any legitimate justification for it. The plaintiff states a good
166. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
167. Id. at 172.
168. Id. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945)).
169. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
170. Id. at 324.
171. 463 U.S. 239 (1983).
172. Id. at 244.
173. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 527 (1884) quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819)).
174. See J. LOCKE, Of Civil Government §§ 95, 123, 131, in Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 330-31, 350, 353 (Cambridge Univ. Press student ed. 1988).
140
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constitutional tort claim in the latter case but not the former. The
beating is an instance of arbitrary, oppressive, or abusive conduct in
violation of the plaintiff's right to respect from government officials.175
The automobile accident is not.176
Viewed against this background of constitutional principles and
precedents, DeShaney is yet another in the line of substantive due pro-
cess cases from Rochin through Daniels. In all these cases the injured
plaintiff claimed that the government deprived him of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, and the Court was called upon to
decide what kinds of governmental conduct were sufficiently egregious
to raise constitutional concerns. The distinctive issue raised by
DeShaney is whether suits requesting recovery for governmental inac-
tion can ever state cognizable constitutional claims.
III. TWO CRITERIA FOR RESOLVING AFFIRMATIVE
DUTY ISSUES
DeShaney's gravest weakness is neither its peremptory dismissal of
the due process clause as a source of affirmative obligations of govern-
ment, nor its confusion over the level of state involvement sufficient to
trigger affirmative obligations. It is, instead, the Court's insensitivity
to the constitutional values underlying the victim's claim for relief.
Nowhere does the Court reaffirm the teaching of its precedents, that
the due prbcess clause is implicated by egregious governmental deci-
sions resulting in harm to the person.
Indeed, Justice Rehnquist's opinion manages to deny relief to
Joshua without even taking account of the knowledge possessed by the
defendants, and the bearing their knowledge may have on the constitu-
tional claim. So far as the majority's reasoning is concerned, Joshua
would lose even if the social worker stood by and watched as his father
beat him.1 7 The challenge of the affirmative duty cases is to devise
175. See Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). See generally Wells & Eaton,
supra note 5, at 254-55.
176. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331-33 (1986).
177. Cf DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1011 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (under the majority's reasoning, officials presumably would not be liable
if they "decided not to help Joshua because his name began with a 'j', or because he was born in
the spring").
The hypothetical suggested in the text is not wholly implausible. Sometimes state officers
really do stand by and do nothing to help persons in distress. See Tucker v. Callahan, 867 F.2d
909 (6th Cir. 1989) (policeman allegedly watched from his parked patrol car as plaintiff was
assaulted thirty yards away; qualified immunity defense upheld); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana,
796 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff injured in barroom brawl; undercover policemen stood by
and did nothing to help; relief denied for failure to state a constitutional claim); Beard v. O'Neal,
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rules that give due regard not only to the state's interest in allocating
scarce resources as it sees fit and the precept that the clause is violated
only by abuses of governmental power, but also to the plaintiff's inter-
est in recovering damages where the government's failure to act suffi-
ciently "shocks the conscience."
Lower federal courts have grappled with this problem for many
years in a wide variety of factual settings. This Part of the Article
draws on the teaching of these cases to propose a decisional frame-
work that rests on two criteria: state involvement and the defendant's
state of mind. Conditioning an affirmative duty on some threshold
level of state involvement affords government the leeway to preserve
its discretion in allocating resources, while still rendering it accounta-
ble for abusive inaction. The state of mind requirement helps separate
abusive governmental inaction of a constitutional dimension from
indifference that should remain wholly within the realm of state tort
law.
Section A discusses state involvement. This Article considers the
various standards suggested in DeShaney and concludes that the lan-
guage of "special relationships" best captures the variety of state
involvement that supports an affirmative duty. Section B then
addresses the essential role of the defendant's state of mind in evaluat-
ing whether governmental inaction can be classified as abusive.
A. State Involvement -
One clear principle emerges from the DeShaney opinion: affirmative
duty claims will fail unless the plaintiff demonstrates some state con-
tribution to the circumstances giving rise to his claim. While the
Court's reliance on constitutional language, history, and precedent are
somewhat shaky underpinnings for this rule, it may be justified in
terms of tort and constitutional policies. The problem of discretion in
allocating resources increases as the field of potential claimants grows
larger. Limiting the scope of constitutional duty to situations where
the government has played some part in generating the danger faced
by the plaintiff substantially diminishes the intrusion on governmental
decisionmaking. In addition, the due process precedents do strongly
suggest that only "abuses" of governmental power are actionable.
Arguably, inaction is less abusive when the passive governmental actor
bears no responsibility for the plaintiff's need for help. In any event,
such a strong majority of the Justices seems to subscribe to this posi-
728 F.2d 894, 899 (7th Cir.) (FBI informant watched as aggressor murdered plaintiff; no
constitutional duty to help), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 825 (1984).
Vol. 66:107, 1991
Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional Tort
tion 7 that this Article takes it as a given throughout the course of its
analysis.
State involvement may take many forms. If some governmental
involvement is necessary to liability for inaction, then the question is
what kind of governmental action will be sufficient. On this issue, the
DeShaney opinion is not helpful. As we have seen, DeShaney discusses
three standards for determining whether state involvement is sufficient
to support an affirmative duty in constitutional tort-involuntary con-
finement, analogies to involuntary confinement, and special relation-
ships.179 These standards represent something of a continuum, with
involuntary confinement being the most restrictive test for affirmative
duties and the special relationship approach being the most generous.
This Article now examines each approach in more detail and explains
why the umbrella of special relationship is the preferred standard.
L Involuntary Confinement
One alternative set forth in DeShaney is to limit the state's liability
for failure to act to situations where the plaintiff is confined against his
will to a state prison or mental hospital. While such a rule has undeni-
able advantages of clarity and convenience, its defects render it an
undesirable solution to a vexing problem. Persons held in state facili-
ties certainly make a strong case for an affirmative duty. As the Court
pointed out in DeShaney, the state in such a case has "so restrain[ed]
an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for him-
self."' 180 The state breaches a constitutional duty if it then "fails to
provide for his basic human needs-e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medi-
cal care, and reasonable safety." 18'
By excluding a large number of potential constitutional claims, an
involuntary confinement rule would avoid the slippery slope of consti-
tutionalizing the right to basic governmental services. Because it
would relieve government officers of liability for failure to act in all
cases except those arising in jails, prisons, and mental institutions, the
rule would provide ample protection to state officers deciding how to
use the state's resources without judicial interference.
178. The dissenters do not contest this point, but they do not altogether concede it either.
Justice Brennan begins by accepting it for purposes of argument. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at
1008-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He and Justice Blackmun insist that the state did contribute
to Joshua's vulnerability. See infra text accompanying notes 242-44.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 86-98.
180. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005.
181. Id at 1005-06.
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An involuntary confinement test also has the advantage of "rule-
ness." It identifies two sets of cases and directs that they be treated
differently, without the need for any further inquiry by the deci-
sionmaker into the wisdom of a decision.182 Under this regime, many
cases could be dismissed without a trial to determine the facts and
without detailed weighing of the pros and cons of imposing liability in
the circumstances of a given case. Avoiding legal standards that turn
on factual nuances-and therefore often cannot be applied without a
trial-is a major theme in the current Court's development of consti-
tutional tort doctrine.183 The Court might well find an involuntary
confinement rule attractive for this reason alone.
Although these arguments are not without force, the considerations
counseling against an involuntary confinement rule are more compel-
ling. One important test of a liability rule is whether it reaches the full
range of cases in which recovery is appropriate, or at least an accepta-
bly large portion of them. The involuntary confinement rule fails on
this score, for it falls short of embracing all instances of official mis-
conduct impinging a plaintiff's constitutionally protected right to
respectful treatment by government officers. Consider the Seventh
Circuit's widely cited opinion upholding liability in White v. Roch-
ford. 184 In that case, the police stopped a car on a busy expressway,
arrested the driver for drag racing, and took him away. Despite his
request that the officers at least call for help, the police left his child
passengers alone in the car to fend for themselves. One of the chil-
dren, an asthmatic, was subsequently hospitalized for a week.
The children were not confined; indeed, the police took no action
against them at all. Nonetheless, the difference between placing a per-
son in custody and using state authority to leave him stranded in a
dangerous place seems too insubstantial to support a rule that would
permit liability in the former case but not the latter. 185 Even judges
182. See Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509, 535, 537-38 (1988).
183. See Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989) (liability of police officers for excessive
force in arrest turns on objective reasonableness and not the officers' subjective motivations);
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (official's subjective beliefs are immaterial to official
immunity defense); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (denial of motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity is immediately appealable).
184. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3325 (1990). In Wood, a woman was left stranded when the police
arrested her companion and impounded his car at 2:00 a.m. She accepted a ride from a stranger,
who raped her. The Ninth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment to the defendant
policemen.
185. See White, 592 F.2d at 384 (noting that "it seems incongruous to suggest that liability
should turn on the tenuous metaphysical construct which differentiates sins of omission and
commission").
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who are generally hostile to the expansion of affirmative duties now
agree that the plaintiffs in White stated a good constitutional tort
case. 1 6 The involuntary confinement rule suggested by DeShaney
should be rejected as it fails to reach a substantial range of such cases
in which official inaction is properly labeled abusive."8 7
2. Analogies to Involuntary Confinement
Even before DeShaney, some courts sought to avoid a rigid involun-
tary confinement rule while still closely restricting the scope of affirm-
ative duty. They did so by asking whether the relationship between
the state and the plaintiff so resembled confinement in its effects on the
plaintiff as to justify recognition of an affirmative duty by analogy to
the confinement principle. In view of the Court's footnote hinting that
it might find this an acceptable resolution of the affirmative duty prob-
lem, the popularity of "analogies to confinement" will likely increase.
Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hospital... is illustrative. The
plaintiff was a pregnant woman who lost her baby when a city ambu-
lance took her to the wrong hospital. Upholding summary judgment
against her, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit said that liability is appro-
priate only when the state "effectively strip[s] a person of her ability to
defend herself, or cut[s] off potential sources of private aid." 1 9
According to the Wideman court, "[t]he key concept is the exercise of
dominion, or restraint by the state."' 190 The standard had not been
met, because "[t]he County did not force or otherwise coerce her into
its ambulance; it merely made the ambulance available to her and she
entered it voluntarily."' 9 As an example of a case that would meet
186. We have in mind Judge Easterbrook, see Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1223
(7th Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989), and Judge Posner, see Jackson v. City of
Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
187. A striking example of the defects of an involuntary confinement rule is the case of
someone voluntarily admitted to a mental institution. If involuntary confinement is the key to
liability, then the voluntarily admitted patient stands on a different footing from someone sent
there against his will. Yet he is quite helpless to look out for his own interests and his relatives
may have no viable option for his care. It is difficult to see why the circumstances of the patient's
commitment entitle him to less attention from directors and employees of the institution than an
involuntary patient receives. See Flowers v. Webb, 575 F. Supp. 1450 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). But cf
Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Social Serv., 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir.) (no affirmative
duty to protect voluntarily placed foster child, distinguishing cases involving involuntary
placements), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 148 (1989).
188. 826 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1987).
189. Id at 1035.
190. Id. at 1035-36.
191. Id. at 1036. Apparently, the plaintiff did not allege that the driver knew she had
requested she be brought to a different hospital until the case reached the appellate court. Id. at
1036 n.8.
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this test, Wideman cited Taylor v. Ledbetter, 92 where the court
upheld a complaint brought against a social services agency by a child
involuntarily placed in a foster home.193 In DeShaney, the Supreme
Court also cited Taylor to suggest that some plaintiffs might be able to
show that their situations were "analogous to incarceration or
institutionalization." 194
Insisting on a relationship with the state that can be analogized to
involuntary confinement may seem to be a plausible compromise
between limiting affirmative duties to confinement cases and liability
based on some other, vaguer standard. Closer scrutiny, however,
reveals that an "analogous to incarceration" rule is no more satisfac-
tory than the confinement rule. A fundamental problem with the for-
mer approach lies in the difficulty of drawing a coherent analogy
between involuntary confinement and the foster care case, or White,,
or any other case where the plaintiff is not literally confined. The
Court's rationale for the involuntary confinement rule is that the state
"by the exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it
renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to
provide for his basic needs."' 95 The foster care case is analogous only
if leaving a child in the care of dangerous persons is viewed as
equivalent to restraining his liberty so that he cannot care for himself.
The key to liability is the helplessness of the victim who is exposed to
danger by the state's action.
If this is the relevant analogy, however, then it appears difficult to
distinguish the foster care case from DeShaney itself, for returning the
child to the care of a dangerous parent is no different in this respect
from placing him in a dangerous foster home. But this cannot be what
the Court meant. Chief Justice Rehnquist took pains to point out that
mere helplessness is not equivalent to confinement. Rather, what
counts is "the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's
freedom to act on his own behalf."'1 96 In the foster care case, no less so
than in DeShaney, this standard is not met.
In fact, it is difficult to see how anything less than arrest or incarcer-
ation could meet this standard. The foster child is not so much
restrained by the state from acting "on his own behalf," as by his own
192. 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1337 (1989).
193. Id. at 800.
194. 109 S. Ct. 998, 1006 n.9 (1989).
195. Id. at 1005.
196. Id. at 1006.
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immaturity.1 97 A sufficiently old and courageous child can make his
feelings known to the authorities and be removed from a home he does
not like. The same could be said for the child plaintiffs in White, who,
as far as the state was concerned, were free to go anywhere they
pleased, and were limited only by their own lack of ability to drive.19
3. Special Relationships
The DeShaney Court discussed basing claims of breach of affirma-
tive duty on the state's involvement in creating dangers to the individ-
ual or increasing her exposure to preexisting risk. At common law
this concept is captured in the term "special relationship." The term
is, of course, not self-defining; rather, to say that the state has a "spe-
cial relationship" to the plaintiff is simply to signify that the court
deems the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff's need
for assistance sufficiently close to warrant imposing an affirmative
duty. In tort law there exist identifiable categories of cases in which
"special relationships" are said to arise. Tracking this body of tort
law, DeShaney itself mentioned three ways in which a special relation-
ship might be established: (1) by way of a positive act that inhibits self-
help or private rescue; (2) by way of a state's positive act that exposes
the plaintiff to danger; and (3) by way of an undertaking that worsens
the plaintiff's position. Each of these patterns of state involvement
will be addressed in order.
a. State Imposed Limitations on Self-Help or Private Rescue
DeShaney recognized that persons involuntarily placed in the cus-
tody of the state are entitled to protection and care by the state. The
Court explains that the imposition of a constitutional affirmative duty
in these circumstances is necessary because of the state imposed limi-
tation "on the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf." '1 99 This
197. See Eugene D. v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 1989) (differences between
incarceration and foster care "raise serious questions as to whether foster care placement is
sufficiently analogous to institutionalization"), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct. 2631 (1990), cf. Doe v.
Bobbitt, 881 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1989) (referring to the "novel analogy between incarceration
and placement in a foster home"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2560 (1990).
198. See also J.O. v. Alton Community Unit School Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir.
1990) (rejecting the analogy between imprisonment and compulsory school attendance);
Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 723-24 (3d Cir. 1989) (in dicta, court
said children compelled to attend school are "arguably" analogous to involuntarily confined
inmates), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 840 (1990); Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Schools, 714 F. Supp.
641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (school children found to be analogous to inmates); Flowers v. Webb, 575
F. Supp. 1450 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (permitting a voluntarily committed mental patient to raise
constitutional claims).
199. 109 S. Ct. 998, 1006 (1989).
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rationale underlies the unanimous view of lower courts that correc-
tional officials are constitutionally obligated to protect inmates from
physical assaults by other inmates2°° and, in some cases, from self-
inflicted injuries.2 1 While many of these cases are grounded in the
eighth amendment, others explicitly rest upon substantive due
process.2 °2
As lower federal courts have recognized, state imposed limitations
on self-help and private rescue are not limited to instances of involun-
tary confinement. A recent Seventh Circuit case is illustrative. In
Ross v. United States,20 3 the complaint alleged that a twelve-year-old
boy fell off a breakwater into Lake Michigan. Although two nearby
scuba diving private citizens offered to help save him, a deputy sheriff,
acting pursuant to county policy, ordered them to stop their rescue
efforts, threatened to arrest them if they persisted, "and even posi-
tioned his boat so as to prevent their dive. ' ' 2 ' Twenty minutes after
the initial rescuers arrived, the officially authorized divers recovered
the boy's body. Upholding the complaint, the court stressed that this
plaintiff asserts "a much different type of constitutional wrong'' 2°'
from the imposition of a duty to provide services that was rejected in
DeShaney. If the allegations of the complaint are true, "the county
had a policy of arbitrarily cutting off private sources of rescue without
providing a meaningful alternative. ' 2°  If Ross is correctly decided,2 °7
the rationale underlying Estelle and Youngberg is not limited to
instances of involuntary confinement, but extends to any situation in
200. E.g., Stubbs v. Dudley, 849 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1095 (1989);
Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1986); Matzker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1984).
201. E.g., Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 835-36 (11th Cir. 1990); Colburn v. Upper Darby
Township, 838 F.2d 663, 669 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989); Partridge v.
Two Unknown Police Officers of Houston, 791 F.2d 1182, 1187 (5th Cir. 1986); Roberts v. City
of Troy, 773 F.2d 720, 724-25 (6th Cir. 1985); cf Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27
(1984) (prison officials are entitled to search prisoners, in part, to prevent prison violence and
suicides).
202. City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (detainee's right
to medical care under the due process clause is at least as great as a prisoner's eighth amendment
rights); Colburn, 838 F.2d at 668 (affirmative constitutional duty to protect pretrial detainee from
suicide); Partridge, 791 F.2d at 1187 (affirmative constitutional duty to protect pretrial detainee
from suicide). Because the eighth amendment does not extend to pretrial detainees, City of
Revere, 463 U.S. at 244, these cases were decided in terms of substantive due process.
203. 910 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1990).
204. Id. at 1425.
205. Id. at 1431.
206. Id.
207. While Ross correctly concluded that state interference with private rescue is sufficient
state involvement to trigger an affirmative duty, the opinion is more problematic with regard to
the defendants' state of mind. As argued in subpart B infra, the defendants' conduct must rise to
the level of deliberate indifference in order to support constitutional tort liability.
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which the state by its positive acts isolates someone and restricts pri-
vate efforts to provide aid.2°8
b. Endangerment by Positive Acts of the State
DeShaney also justified its holding by noting that the state "played
no part" in the creation of the danger faced by Joshua.2° The nega-
tive implication of this reasoning is that the state might have an affirm-
ative duty to protect persons from dangers the state does create. Theimposition of liability in this type of case rests on simple fairness. As
explained by Judge Posner, "[i]f a state puts a man in a position of
danger from private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not
be heard to say that its role is merely passive; it is as much an active
tort-feasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit." 210
Positive endangerment presents an even stronger case for imposing
an affirmative duty than interference with self-help or private rescue.
This is so because in the positive endangerment cases, the state is at
least partially responsible for exposing the plaintiff to danger in the
first place. Thus, unlike the interference with private rescue or self-
help cases, the state itself is the source of the threat to the plaintiff's
well-being. Yet, the cases reveal that not all state contributions to the
plaintiff's danger are sufficient to give rise to an affimative duty to
help. Courts distinguish between situations where the endangering
force is another state actor and those in which it comes from some
other source.
208. The holding in Ross was foreshadowed by dicta in two earlier Seventh Circuit cases. In
Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443 (7th Cir. 1984) the court held that a city has no constitutional
obligation to provide firefighting services, or even to allow striking firemen access to city
equipment necessary to put out a blaze. But the court recognized that state interference with
private rescuers, as by "block[ing] the path of the [striking] fire fighters as they endeavored to
reach the apartment," could constitute a substantive due process violation. Id. at 1448.
Similarly, in Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), a policeman at the scene of
an accident directed traffic away from the burning vehicle but failed to check the car to see if
anyone was inside. The court found that the officer's behavior manifested only negligence or
gross negligence, and refused to impose liability on the ground that constitutional tort requires a
more culpable state of mind. Significantly, the court's analysis appears premised on the notion
that directing potential rescuers away from the victims may be a constitutional tort if it is
accompanied by the requisite culpability. Id at 1202. The Ross court relied on the reasoning of
Byrne and City of Joliet to deny a qualified immunity defense to the deputy sheriff, ruling that, in
view of those cases, he "should have known that he could not use [his] authority to prevent
private rescue efforts." Ross, 910 F.2d at 1433.
209. 109 S. Ct. 998, 1006 (1989).
210. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
149
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(1) Endangerment by Another State Actor
In some circumstances the standard rules governing supervisory
and governmental liability for the acts of subordinates will suffice to
provide the victim of official misconduct with an effective remedy
against a state defendant other than the aggressor himself. Consider
Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District."'1 Kathleen Stoneking was
a student subjected to sexual abuse and harassment by the band direc-
tor of Bradford High School. She asserted that the principal and
school board officials were aware of the band director's conduct, but
took no action to protect her. Relying on these allegations, she sued
both the officials and the school district. In denying the defendants'
motion for summary judgment, the Third Circuit ruled that Ms.
Stoneking's constitutional injury resulted from the defendants' "own
actions in adopting and maintaining a practice, custom or policy of
reckless indifference to instances of known or suspected sexual abuse
of students by teachers., 21
2
Stoneking's casting of the affirmative duty issue in terms of inade-
quate supervision allows for some claimants to seek redress from
either the aggressor's supervisors or his governmental employer. It is
well established that governmental entities may be sued for constitu-
tional torts caused by their "official policies," '13 and that inadequate
training is such a policy, providing it is so bad as to amount to "delib-
erate indifference" to the constitutional rights of persons subjected to
state authority.214 With regard to governmental liability, Stoneking's
only innovation was to extend this rule from inadequate training to
inadequate supervision, a step that the Supreme Court may well find
appropriate.
The Stoneking court also permitted suit against the school officials
with supervisory authority over the abusive band director. This the-
ory may succeed even if the school district itself cannot, because of the
211. 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 840 (1990).
212. Id. at 724-25. But cf J.0. v. Alton Community Unity School Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267
(7th Cir. 1990) (no duty to protect child from sexual harassment; rejecting the analogy between
imprisonment and compulsory school attendance); D.T. v. Independent School Dist. No. 16, 894
F.2d 1176 (10th Cir. 1990) (court rejected school district liability for teacher's sexual molestation
of students on ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the school district's
policy of investigating, hiring, and supervising teachers constituted deliberate indifference or
reckless disregard for plaintiff's constitutional rights); Spann v. Tyler Indep. School Dist., 876
F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1989) (school district not liable under § 1983 for principal's failure to properly
investigate reports of student sexual abuse because student's injuries not caused by school
district's policy granting principal complete discretion regarding investigation of such charges),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 847 (1990).
213. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
214. City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989).
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absence of an "official policy," be held responsible for the acts of its
supervisors.215 Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed
the issue, lower courts generally hold supervisory officials liable for the
acts of their underlings if the supervisors' conduct manifests "deliber-
ate indifference" to the plaintiff's constitutional rights.216
These avenues of redress are appealing because they avoid the lan-
guage of affirmative duty and may consequently prove more accepta-
ble to the Supreme Court. Their reach is limited, however, to
circumstances where the endangering state agent is a subordinate of
the passive supervisor, or where the governmental employer itself may
be deemed responsible for the inadequacy of supervision. Stoneking's
approach would not reach cases where the passive state agent is a mere
co-worker or subordinate of the aggressor. Yet, courts have uniformly
imposed constitutional tort liability on policemen and prison guards
for their failure to protect the plaintiff from the misconduct of another
officer.217
An illustrative case is O'Neill v. Krzeminsk 218 Officer Conners sat
passively as Officer Krzeminski and Sergeant Fiorillo beat a hand-
cuffed prisoner with a night stick. Conners was held liable, not on the
basis of vicarious liability for the acts of other officers, but because his
own inaction violated O'Neill's constitutional rights. What is most
notable about cases like O'Neill is their failure to identify any constitu-
tional theory for imposing liability. The courts invariably fail to iden-
tify the constitutional basis of the passive officer's personal liability,
and instead offer bare declarations that the passive policeman is consti-
tutionally obligated to protect the plaintiff from a beating at the hands
of another officer.219
In the wake of Graham v. Connor,220 the liability of the officer
inflicting the beating may be grounded in the fourth amendment's pro-
215. Cf. Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 567 (Ist Cir. 1989) (distinguishing
between the criteria for recovery in suits against municipalities and the criteria applicable to suits
against supervisors); see Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing
supervisory and municipal liability).
216. Se eg., Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836-37 (11th Cir. 1990); Taylor v. List, 880
F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Bolin v. Black, 875 F.2d 1343, 1348-49 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 542 (1989); Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304-05 (5th Cir. 1987); Orpiano v.
Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929 (1981).
217. O'Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1988); Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269,
276 (7th Cir. 1986); Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002 (1 lth Cir. 1986); Webb v. Hiykel, 713 F.2d 405
(8th Cir. 1983); Bruner v. Dunaway, 684 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171
(1983); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972).
218. 839 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1988).
219. See cases cited at supra note 217.
220. 109 S. CL 1865 (1989).
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hibition against unreasonable seizures. That rationale could not sup-
port the personal liability of the passive officer as he has neither seized
the plaintiff, nor acted in concert with the officer who did. In reality
these cases are best understood in terms of the framework suggested in
this Article. The endangerment of the plaintiff by the positive acts of
one state actor is sufficient state involvement to place an affirmative
duty on the other officer who stands idly by.
(2) Endangerment by a Private Actor or External Circumstances
While endangerment by a state actor generally results in the imposi-
tion of an affirmative duty upon other officials to rescue the victim,
another group of cases presents more difficult problems for the plain-
tiff. These cases concern situations in which the immediate menace
comes from a private actor, yet the state has in some way increased the
plaintiff's vulnerability to the danger. Government action that con-
tributes to a general increase in danger is almost always insufficient to
trigger a duty to protect. Courts routinely disallow claims brought by
those suffering at the hands of inmates released by parole,22' fur-
lough,222 or escape.223 The positive act of state officials in releasing
the dangerous person clearly increases the general level of risk to soci-
ety. It is not, however, a risk peculiar to the individual plaintiff.224
The moral responsibility of the state for the subsequent act of the
released inmate is viewed as too attenuated to justify imposing
liability.
In Martinez v. California 221 for example, the parole board released a
man convicted of attempted rape. Five months later he tortured and
killed a fifteen-year-old girl. Her family sued the parole board mem-
bers in constitutional tort, charging that their decision deprived the
victim of her life without due process of law. The Supreme Court
denied relief, explaining that the murderer's act "cannot fairly be char-
221. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); Janan v. Trammell, 785 F.2d 557
(6th Cir. 1986); Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1983); Doe v. United Social & Mental
Health Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Conn. 1987); cf Humann v. Wilson, 696 F.2d 783 (loth
Cir. 1983) (attacker had been moved from jail to a community corrections facility where he could
roam about the town); Bowers v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982) (released mental patient).
222. Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714 (lst Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882
(1986).
223. Ketchum v. Alameda Co., 811 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1987); Commonwealth Bank & Trust
Co. v. Russell, 825 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1987).
224. Where the risk is directed at particular individuals who are identified before the release,
courts are divided. Compare Estate of Gilmore, 787 F.2d 714 (no constitutional duty) with Beck
v. Kansas Univ. Psychiatry Found., 580 F. Supp. 527 (D. Kan. 1984) (recognizing a
constitutional duty).
225. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
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acterized as state action," and that "the parole board was not aware"
of any "special danger" toward this victim, "as distinguished from the
public at large." '226 Hence, the crime was "too remote a consequence
of the parole officer's action to hold them responsible" for a constitu-
tional tort.227 Martinez clearly curbs the ability of courts to impose
constitutional tort liability on officials whose decisions facilitate pri-
vate wrongs.
It would be a mistake, however, to treat Martinez as a blanket rejec-
tion of all constitutional claims arising from fact patterns where a pri-
vate actor is the immediate source of danger. The Court itself
cautioned against such a broad reading of the case,228 and lower fed-
eral courts sometimes have encountered circumstances warranting the
imposition of liability. The crucial factor distinguishing these cases
from Martinez is the extent of the state's contribution to the plaintiff's
peril.
Nishiyama v. Dickson County22 9 features an especially compelling
constellation of facts. The county sheriff routinely allowed a trusty
inmate to have unsupervised use of a fully marked and equipped patrol
car. On the day in question, he left the car in the inmate's hands, and
took no action for ten hours after receiving reports that the trusty was
using the patrol car to stop and harass passing motorists. During this
time the trusty stopped and murdered the plaintiff's daughter. The
Sixth Circuit ruled that failure to respond to reports that the trusty
was endangering motorists constituted an "arbitrary use of govern-
ment power. '2
31
The court distinguished other dangerous release cases in which no
duty to protect was found on the basis of additional state involvement.
In Martinez, "the only action of the state officers was their decision to
release from custody the person who subsequently committed the
murder." '231 Here, in contrast, "state officers by their acts facilitate[d]
the crime by providing the criminal with the necessary means and the
specific opportunity to commit his crime." '232 The principal difference
226. Id. at 285.
227. Id.
228. Id. ("We need not and do not decide that a parole officer could never be deemed to
'deprive' someone of life by action taken in connection with the release of a prisoner on parole.")
(footnote omitted)).
229. 814 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1987).
230. Id. at 282.
231. Id. at 281.
232. Id. at 280-81. Nishiyama's reasoning survives DeShaney. In the recent case of
Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1784
(1990), a town clerk was abducted and terrorized by prison inmates assigned to a community
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between Martinez and Nishiyama is one of degree, for in both cases the
state-actor defendant "facilitate[d] the crime." The key point is that,
in sufficiently egregious circumstances, inaction following such facili-
tation becomes an "abuse of power" justifying recovery by the victim.
White v. Rochford23 3 illustrates the operation of the same critical
principle in a somewhat different context. The complaint alleged that
the police arrested a driver for drag racing on an expressway. Despite
his pleas, they left his passengers, three children too young to drive,
stranded in the abandoned car beside a busy, eight lane, limited access
highway. Ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court began its analysis
by noting that the due process clause protects the right "to be free
from, and to obtain judicial relief for unjustified intrusions on personal
security." '2 34 If the allegations of the complaint were true, then the
police "left helpless minor children subject to inclement weather and
great physical danger without any apparent justification." '235 Accord-
ingly, the court held that this set of facts would make out a due pro-
cess violation.
It did not matter that the police left the children stranded by depriv-
ing them of a driver rather than by discharging them from a police car.
In either event, state authority would remove the children's protector.
The defendants knew that their actions left the children in a vulnera-
ble position. Under these circumstances it would be "incongruous to
suggest that liability should turn on the tenuous metaphysical con-
struct which differentiates sins of omission and commission. 236
Neither White nor Nishiyama seems at odds with DeShaney. The
DeShaney Court carefully qualified its opinion by noting that the
defendant child welfare workers were not responsible for Joshua's
need for protection. In the wake of DeShaney,, lower federal courts
have continued to impose constitutional tort liability in cases involving
harm inflicted by a private person when official defendants played a
work squad program. The inmates were assigned to work near the town hall under direct
supervision of state agents. Government officials dictated which inmates were to be released
under the program and the degree of supervision they were to receive. As town clerk, the
plaintiff was forced by operation of law to work alongside the inmates. The court viewed the
plaintiff's claim as being more analogous to Nishiyama than DeShaney because the defendants in
Cornelius "did indeed create the dangerous situation." Id. at 356; see also Gibson v. City of
Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510 (7th Cir. 1990) (city helped create danger by allowing mentally ill police
officer to retain weapon after being declared unfit for duty).
233. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
234. Id. at 383 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)).
2 35. Id. at 384.
236. Id.
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large role in exposing the plaintiff to the hazard.237 Moreover, the
results in these cases are wholly consonant with the tort and constitu-
tional principles delineated in Part II. The use of state power to place
the plaintiff in a position of danger provides a powerful equitable basis
for imposing a duty of protection. The state's contribution to the dan-
ger and its ability to help are narrowly confined by the facts, so that
imposition of a duty to prevent the harm is far removed from a consti-
tutional duty to provide general services. The greater the govern-
ment's involvement in producing the dangerous situation, the more
heavily implicated is the due process clause as a bulwark against abuse
of governmental power.
c. Undertakings that Worsen the Plaintiffs Position
Before the Supreme Court's opinion in DeShaney, lower federal
courts recognized that governmental defendants may owe affirmative
duties even where they have neither restrained self-help nor them-
selves endangered the plaintiff. The requisite state involvement may
take the form of an undertaking to help and an ensuing failure to fol-
low through on the promise. An illustrative case is Balistreri v.
Pacifica Police Department. 238 The plaintiff was repeatedly beaten by
her husband. She eventually secured a restraining order enjoining her
husband from having any contact with her. Despite the restraining
order and the police department's knowledge that the husband was
continuing to commit acts of violence, the police refused to arrest Mr.
Balistreri before he had gravely injured his wife. The Ninth Circuit
originally concluded that a special relationship arose between Mrs.
Balistreri and the police based upon the state's undertaking to protect
her embodied in the restraining order. "[T]he restraining order
together with the defendants' repeated notice of Balistreri's plight...
are sufficient to state a claim that the defendants owed Balistreri a
duty to take reasonable measures to protect Balistreri from her
estranged husband. 2 9
Joshua DeShaney's case, however, suggests the limits of the under-
takings approach. The Winnebago County Department of Social
237. See, ag., K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910
F.2d 1510 (7th Cir. 1990); Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989),
cerL denied, 110 S. Ct. 1784 (1990); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert
denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3325 (1990); Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1989).
238. 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988), superceded 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990).
239. Id. at 1426. The court also allowed the plaintiff to pursue an equal protection claim
based on the defendants' allegedly sexually discriminatory response to domestic violence
complaints.
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Services had undertaken to help Joshua by securing temporary cus-
tody of him and then assigning a caseworker to keep an eye on the
family. Why was this state involvement insufficient to impose an
affirmative duty? The answer is unclear. Parts of the opinion suggest
that a mere undertaking to help will never be enough to support liabil-
ity. At one point Justice Rehnquist seems to reject all affirmative obli-
gations, except where the state "so restrains an individual's liberty that
it renders him unable to care for himself.'2 4" Later in the opinion, the
objection to granting relief appears to be less categorical, for the Court
stresses that the state left Joshua "in no worse position than that in
which he would have been had it not acted at all." '241 Presumably a
plaintiff who can show that state intervention did leave him worse off,
as by inducing him to lower his guard or by deterring other potential
rescuers, would overcome the barrier to affirmative duty.
Why was Joshua unable to meet the Court's standard? According
to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the state's involvement went no further
than taking Joshua from his father's home and then returning him
there. The Court's account of the state's role, however, was far too
narrow. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, the state estab-
lished "a child welfare system specifically designed to help children
like Joshua," and "channels all ... reports [of abuse] to the local
departments.., for evaluation and.., further action." '242 The depart-
ment of social services then decides whether to take action to protect a
particular child from abuse. This administrative structure will likely
lead anyone who might have helped Joshua to "feel that her job was
done as soon as she had reported her suspicions.., to DSS."243 In its
absence, individuals or other government officials may have taken fur-
ther steps instead of relying on the department of social services.
Accordingly, it is plausible that "children like Joshua are made worse
off by the existence of this program."244
Admittedly, there is a hypothetical quality to the potential alterna-
tive rescue. Plaintiffs may be unable to identify specific individuals
who were deterred from action by reason of the state undertaking.
But the problem of proof is significantly due to the state's preemption
of the field. The DeShaney majority appears oblivious to the subtle
and pervasive ways by which the state affects relationships and indi-
vidual behavior. Its treatment of Joshua's case reflects a conception of
240. 109 S. Ct. 998, 1005 (1989).
241. Id. at 1006.
242. Id. at 1010 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 1011 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
244. Id.
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the state "as a thing" separate from the "natural world, in which the
abuse of children is an unfortunate, yet external, ante-legal, and pre-
political fact of our society."245 Because it started from this premise,
the Court did not inquire whether "the hand of the state may have
altered an already political landscape in a way that encouraged such
child-beating to go uncorrected."'246 Such an inquiry might lead one
to conclude that the state's promise of protection to a specific individ-
ual ought to give rise to an affirmative duty without strict proof of
detrimental reliance. From this perspective, the government's failure
to keep its promise to the vulnerable individual may be sufficiently
abusive to trigger the substantive protections of the due process clause.
As a practical matter, however, DeShaney will likely foreclose
affirmative duty claims based on undertakings unless the plaintiff can
offer specific evidence of detrimental reliance. Mrs. Balistreri, for
example, did not allege that the restraining order induced her to
forego other measures to protect herself. Nor did she plead that the
restraining order deterred others from protecting her. Indeed, after
DeShaney was decided, the Ninth Circuit reconsidered its decision in
Balistreri Finding no material distinction between the nonenforce-
ment of the restraining order and government's undertakings in
DeShaney, the court rejected Mrs. Balistreri's due process claim.2 47
Occasionally, however, a plaintiff may be able to prove detrimental
reliance on the government's promise of protection. In G-69 v.
Degnan,248 for example, an undercover informant sought the protec-
tion of the government when his identity was discovered by persons
from his past. The government promised to protect the plaintiff-
informant and provide him with a new identity should his position be
uncovered. The district court found a "special relationship" grounded
on the informant's reliance on the government's promise of protection.
"It is difficult to imagine that a person would enlist for such a danger-
ous position absent some guarantee of personal safety. Having made
such a guarantee, when there is so clear a risk to an individual's life
and liberty, the state may not, consistent with the Constitution, walk
245. Tribe, supra note 9, at 10.
246. Id.
247. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1990). But see Freeman v.
Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1990) (recognizing a section 1983 claim against a chief of police
who refused to enforce a restraining order because the husband was a friend. The court
characterized the defendant's conduct as creating a danger that increased the plaintiff's
vulnerability); see also Note, Section 1983 and Domestic Violence: A Solution to the Problem of
Police Officers'Inaction, 30 B.C.L. Rnv. 1357, 1380 (1989).
248. 745 F. Supp. 254 (D.NJ. 1990).
157
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away from its bargain."249 Perhaps governmental undertakings and
promises will give rise to special relationships in other contexts as
well.2 5
0
4. Summary
DeShaney forecloses the argument that there is a general constitu-
tional right to protection. The opinion affirms, however, that a consti-
tutional duty to protect may arise if there is sufficient state connection
with the plaintiff's need for help. The Court's opinion provides little
guidance on how much state involvement is necessary. We have
shown in the preceding section that an affirmative duty rule limited to
instances of involuntary confinement would not reach all instances
where governmental inaction should be seen as unconstitutional.
Analogies to confinement are ultimately artificial and intellectually
unsatisfying; foster children simply are not denied means of self-help
or private rescue in the same manner as are prison inmates. The com-
mon law tort concept of special relationship offers the proper balance
between structure and flexibility necessary to grapple with claims
based on governmental inaction. Hoping to avoid the tyranny of
labels, we have described the three principal types of state involvement
that ought to trigger a constitutional duty to help.
Our suggested framework incorporates the current case law but is
not intended to be exhaustive. No doubt at some point a new fact
pattern will emerge in which a duty to act is appropriate.2"1 The cen-
249. Id. at 265. The court held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on
the claims for money damages on the basis of qualified immunity. The court based this ruling on
its conclusion that a constitutional right to protection had not been clearly established at the time
of the events in question. The court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
plaintiff's request for prospective injunctive relief. The court reasoned that an award of
prospective injunctive relief is not precluded by qualified immunity, and the factual record could
support a jury finding that the defendant's failure to protect the plaintiff constituted a due
process violation; see also Piechowicz v. United States, 885 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989) (no duty to
protect witness in drug prosecution absent an express agreement to do so).
250. Assume, for example, that the police promise to protect a witness and his family and
suddenly withdraw their protection without notice. The witness may be able to prove that he
was deterred from taking alternative safety measures in reliance on the defendants' undertaking
to protect. Cf Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 183-84 (7th Cir. 1985) (here the
plaintiff asked the bodyguards to leave). A tavern owner may forego hiring private security in
reliance on the police department's promise to increase its patrol of the parking lot. Cf Tucker
v. Callahan, 867 F.2d 909, 914 (6th Cir. 1989) (ruling that "the alleged agreement between the
city and the Harbour Inn management with regard to the Harbour Inn parking lot created no
'special relationship' between the city and the [assault victim]").
251. Note, too, that the three identified categories of state involvement are not mutually
exclusive. For example, the state's constitutional duty to protect inmates may be justified both in
terms of restrictions on self-protection as well as placing the inmate in a position of danger.
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tral premise is that state involvement may take many forms. Courts
cannot, and in any event should not, avoid fact sensitive inquiries as to
state involvement in individual cases.
State involvement, however, is only one of the two factors that a
court must consider in assessing a claim of affirmative duty. This
Article now turns to the second, and perhaps more important consid-
eration-the defendant's state of mind.
B. The Defendant's State of Mind
Constitutional affirmative duties, whose doctrinal foundation is the
due process clause, must ultimately rest on a judgment that the con-
tested governmental action is egregious or abusive. In determining
which failures to act amount to constitutional violations and which
must be left to state law, it is essential to ascertain how much the
official knew about the plaintiff's predicament and why he did nothing
to help. The Court in DeShaney did not consider the state-of-mind
issue; it did not have to, because it found insufficient state involvement
to trigger a duty to protect.25 2
While DeShaney is the Court's most recent opinion to avoid the
state of mind issue, it is by no means the only one. This section exam-
ines the Court's practice of evading the state of mind issue and the
reasons for it. The section then explains why it is necessary to face
this question squarely in adjudicating affirmative duty as well as other
substantive due process cases. This Article proposes that officials be
liable in special relationship cases for failures to act that, in view of the
official's knowledge of the circumstances, amount to deliberate indif-
ference to the victim's need for help.
L The Supreme Court's Aversion to State of Mind Inquiries
In Daniels v. Williams," 3 the Court held that negligently infficted
personal injury was not the kind of abuse of power forbidden by the
due process clause. The central point of Daniels is that the defendant's
state of mind is a critical inquiry in any substantive due process case to
recover for personal injury." 4 Because the function of the due process
clause is to protect persons against arbitrary, oppressive, or abusive
252. 109 S. Ct. 998, 1007 n.10 (1989).
253. 474 U.S. 327 (1986). The Court had previously skirted the issue of the state of mind
necessary to support constitutional tort liability. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979);
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), the
Court stated that one could be "deprived" of property through negligence. Daniels overruled
this aspect of Parrat. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-31.
254. See also Wells & Eaton, supra note 5, at 221-34.
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behavior by government officials, it is necessary to know an official's
motivation in order to make out a good case. The school principal's
swat with a paddle might be a routine part of his job or an abuse of
power, depending on whether he did it to maintain discipline or sum-
marily to punish a student whose hair length annoyed him.
Daniels is atypical in emphasizing state of mind. A persistent theme
in the Court's constitutional tort jurisprudence is an effort to devise
rules for resolving cases without the need to inquire into the defend-
ant's knowledge or motives. DeShaney grasps for limits on liability
based on the kind of state participation at issue in the case. Graham v.
Connor,25 another case decided last term, ruled that claims against
policemen for excessive force in an arrest should be adjudicated solely
under a fourth amendment "objective reasonableness" standard, and
not a substantive due process test that would consider the motivations
behind the officers' conduct.256 After Graham, it is apparently impos-
sible to recover from a police officer if the circumstances of the arrest
were such that a reasonable officer could have acted as he did, even if a
plaintiff can show that this officer in fact acted out of pure malice.
257
This effort to limit state of mind investigations extends to other con-
stitutional tort issues. Martinez v. California 258 employed the rhetoric
of proximate cause to avoid an inquiry into state of mind. The defend-
ant officials paroled a dangerous sex offender, who five months later
murdered a young girl. Although the complaint characterized the
release as "reckless, willful, wanton and malicious, ' 259 the Court
upheld dismissal of the complaint. Mr. Justice Stevens explained that
the victim's death "is too remote a consequence of the parole officers'
action to hold them responsible under the federal civil rights law," 2"
thereby avoiding a trial on whether the officials really did act reck-
lessly or maliciously in releasing the man.
The most prominent illustration of the Court's aversion to state of
mind inquiries is its treatment of the law of official immunity. Under
prior law, officials who violated constitutional rights could escape lia-
bility only by meeting both a subjective and an objective test. The
official had to show not only that he acted "sincerely and with a belief
255. 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).
256. Id. at 1870-71.
257. See, e.g., Reed v. Hoy, 891 F.2d 1421, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1989).
258. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
259. Id. at 280.
260. Id. at 285.
Vol. 66:107, 1991
Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional Tort
that he [was] doing right," but also that the constitutional rule he
breached was not settled law at the time he acted.2 6 '
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald26 and Anderson v. Creighton,263 the Court
abandoned the subjective part of this test. Harlow held that officials
"generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established... rights of which a rea-
sonable person would have known," 2  and Anderson made it explicit
that the defendant's "subjective beliefs ... are irrelevant. ' 26 5 As a
result, the policeman who conducts an illegal search and seizure,
believing it to be illegal and intending to harass someone for the sake
of his own sadistic pleasure may avoid liability. He need only show
that the law was sufficiently unsettled that "a reasonable officer could
have believed" the search to be lawful.
266
Why does the Court strive to minimize examination of the defend-
ant's state of mind? Harlow suggests that the need for cases to go to
trial in order to resolve subjective inquiries is an important reason to
avoid them.267 The burden of a trial is one that officials should be
spared if possible.26 In addition, "lj]udicial inquiry into subjective
motivation[s]... may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing
of... an official's professional colleagues," inquiries that are "pecu-
liarly disruptive of effective government. ' 2 6 9
This argument rests on two unarticulated empirical premises. The
first is that government officers rarely abuse their authority or act with
a motive to injure someone. The second is that state of mind inquiries
unduly disrupt the operation of efficient government. If one questions
either of these premises, 27 0 lawsuits entailing inquiry into officials'
motives would be justified.
261. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
262. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
263. 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987).
264. 457 U.S. at 818.
265. 107 S. Ct. at 3040-42.
266. Id at 3040; see, e.g., Schertz v. Waupaca County, 875 F.2d 578, 582-84 (7th Cir. 1989).
Some commentators assert that the government official who knowingly violates the law will not
be shielded by qualified immunity even if the underlying constitutional right was not clearly
established at the time of the conduct. See Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases
The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. REv. 597, 616-18 (1989).
267. 457 U.S. at 816.
268. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (allowing interlocutory appeals of summary
judgment denials based on the official immunity defense).
269. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817.
270. One may question the extent of the burden constitutional tort litigation places on the
operation of government. See Eisenberg & Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation,
72 CORNELL L. REv. 641 (1987); Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Section 1983 Suits in
the Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. RaV. 610, 637 (1979).
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2. Why the State of Mind Issue Cannot Be Evaded
In order to put this group of cases in perspective, it is important to
recall that limiting liability so as to avoid state of mind inquiries is not
without cost. The price is paid by the victims of abusive or oppressive
behavior on the part of government officers. In the official immunity
context, Harlow and Creighton removed one of the two pre-existing
means of defeating a qualified immunity defense. Graham, by
rejecting any subjective inquiry, eliminated a pre-existing theory of
recovery for excessive force by the police. While much uncertainty
remains, DeShaney suggests that the Court may endeavor to limit lia-
bility in affirmative duty cases by distinguishing among various kinds
of state involvement without any reference to state of mind. The tenor
of the opinion, if not its narrow holding, reflects too much concern for
the cost of state of mind inquiries in terms of the burden they place on
the affected officials, and underestimates the frequency in which
officers' actions and omissions are badly motivated.
The importance of state of mind to claims based on government
inaction is evident when one considers the cases in which the Supreme
Court has already recognized affirmative constitutional duties. In
Estelle v. Gamble,271 the Court distinguished between the state tort of
medical malpractice and the constitutional tort of cruel and unusual
punishment by reference to the defendant's knowledge and motives. A
prison official who inadvertently denies an inmate needed medical care
has not transgressed the constitutional standard of care. Only the
prison official who evidences "deliberate indifference" to the inmate's
"serious medical need" '272 is subject to constitutional tort liability.
Significantly, the degree of state involvement is exactly the same in
the case of negligent, and of deliberate, medical inattention. In each
instance, and to the same extent, the state "so restrains an individual's
liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself." '273 Similarly,
the extent of the injury resulting from the denial of medical care may
be identical in the two cases. The single factor that allows one but not
the other claim to proceed in constitutional tort is the defendant's
state of mind.
3. Selecting an Appropriate Liability Rule
If the Court is to give constitutional values the protection they
deserve, it will have to specify the sort of official attitude that exceeds
271. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
272. Id. at 105-06.
273. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1005 (1989).
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constitutionally permissible bounds. Daniels took the first step in
addressing this problem by holding that negligence does not constitute
a due process violation. The task that remains for the Court is to
select a liability standard from among the remaining alternatives,
ranging from intentional misconduct, to recklessness, to gross
negligence. 274
Deciding precisely where to draw the constitutional line requires a
delicate balancing of state and individual interests. While fundamen-
tal constitutional principles call for a rule that some level of official
insensitivity violates the Constitution, it is difficult to decide among
these alternatives other than on the basis of raw value judgments. The
interests of persons harmed as a result of the state's lack of concern
would be best served by a gross negligence test, the most liberal choice
available and one that is sometimes characterized as just another
shade of negligence. 275 Conversely, the state's interest in freedom
from constitutional restraints on its conduct would fare best under a
rule that officials cannot be liable in the absence of intentional miscon-
duct. Under such a test a defendant might know of the victim's peril,
fail to act out of callous lack of concern, and yet escape liability
because he did not actually intend the harm.
It would be better for the Court to reject both extremes in favor of
the "deliberate indifference" rule it already uses to resolve failure to
act issues in the eighth amendment context,276 and that it recently
adopted as the standard for determining whether a municipality
should be liable for inadequate training of an employee who commits a
constitutional tort.27 7 Under this approach it is not necessary to show
that the officer intended harm, but neither does carelessness suffice.
The standard is akin to the tort law test focusing on reckless disregard
of a high probability that harm will occur unless action is taken.
Allowing plaintiffs to prevail on a showing of less than intentional
misconduct again raises the problem of the slippery slope. Aggressive
and clever lawyers are bound to pursue any opportunity to convert
ordinary negligence cases into constitutional torts. In the common
law of torts, it has proven notoriously difficult to cabin liability rules
requiring a higher state of mind than negligence. Courts treat gross
274. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986).
275. See eg., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1219 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 1338 (1989).
276. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
277. See City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204 & n.8 (1989). For an illustration of
the application of this standard, see Merritt v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 769-71 (9th
Cir. 1989).
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negligence as a form of negligence, conflate gross negligence with reck-
lessness, and wind up giving juries broad discretion to characterize as
reckless conduct that is fairly described as merely negligent.278
Lower federal courts, however, have managed quite well to apply
the deliberate indifference standard so as to avoid the slippery slope.
In resolving inmate complaints concerning the adequacy of medical
care, lower courts have been able to distinguish between simple mal-
practice and deliberate indifference. Through the traditional process
of case-by-case determination, general principles have emerged. To
establish a constitutional claim an inmate must allege and prove that
the defendant deliberately failed to respond to the inmate's serious
medical needs of which he was aware.2 79 Thus, refusing to provide
prescribed treatment 28° or denying the inmate's access to medical per-
sonnel qualified to evaluate his condition281 can be considered deliber-
ate indifference. On the other hand, disagreements as to diagnosis and
treatment do not rise to the level of a constitutional claim. 282
To be sure, the line separating simple negligence from deliberate
indifference is fine, and the resolution of particular claims will neces-
sarily turn on the facts of each case. Requiring an inmate to wait two
and one-half days to be examined by the regularly scheduled physician
does not violate constitutional standards when the inmate does not
manifest outward signs of serious injury.283 By contrast, a defendant
who delays a few hours in providing care to an inmate he knows is
stabbed or shot may be properly labeled as deliberately indifferent.284
278. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 105, at 210-14.
279. E.g., Miltier v. Beom, 896 F.2d 848, 852-53 (4th Cir. 1990); Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d
783, 787-90 (1 lth Cir. 1989).
280. E.g., Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241 (6th Cir. 1989) (failure to provide
clean catheter for paraplegic inmate), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2173 (1990); Washington v.
Dugger, 860 F.2d 1018, 1021 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (failure to provide inmate with solution defendants
knew would relieve inmate's pain).
281. E.g., Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783 (11th Cir. 1989) (refusal of county's physician's
assistant to refer inmate to physician for examination despite inmate complaints and visible loss
of use of leg over a three month period); Carswell v. Bay County, 854 F.2d 454 (1 lth Cir. 1988)
(refusal to refer inmate to physician despite knowledge of skin rash, constipation and significant
weight loss).
282. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (disagreement whether X-ray was needed);
Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1989) (disagreement over efficacy of treatment of boils
with antibiotics); cf Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (1989) (alleged disagreement by two
prison doctors over proper treatment fails to state a claim for relief under section 1983).
283. Maxwell v. Conn, 893 F.2d 1335 (6th Cir. 1990).
284. Reed v. Dunham, 893 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1990) (two hour delay in treating inmate with
a serious stab wound); Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 943-46 (4th Cir. 1987) (two hour delay in
treating an inmate with a gun shot wound).
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To say that the distinction between constitutional and common law
claims turns on the facts of particular cases does not mean that every
case must be resolved by a jury. Courts have demonstrated ample
ability to summarily dispose of eighth amendment claims that fail to
allege or substantiate deliberate indifference. 2 85 These same courts are
equally capable of distinguishing between deliberately indifferent and
merely careless governmental inactidn.
4. Summary
The Supreme Court is misguided in attempting to resolve affirma-
tive duty claims by reference only to the degree of state involvement
with the plaintiff's need for help. Even when a government official is
clearly obligated to protect a plaintiff, inaction does not violate the
Constitution unless accompanied by the requisite state of mind. A
jailer's liability in constitutional tort for failing to prevent an inmate's
suicide does not hinge on the degree of state involvement. Rather con-
stitutional tort liability turns on the jailer's awareness of the risk, and
the adequacy of any protective measures taken."8 6 Even DeShaney
concedes the jailer is duty bound by the Constitution to protect the
inmate from self-inflicted injury.2 87
Governmental indifference to an individual's plight should be con-
sidered sufficiently abusive to trigger constitutional protection when it
is the product of a conscious decision. The Supreme Court must,
therefore, consider a government official's state of mind in order to
develop a coherent framework for analyzing affirmative duty cases.
We submit that the standard of deliberate indifference reasonably bal-
ances the individual's interest in securing governmental concern and
respect with the state's interest in maintaining discretion in allocating
its resources. This standard, adopted in other constitutional tort con-
texts, has proven a workable basis for distinguishing complaints of
constitutional magnitude from those that properly remain the exclu-
sive province of state law.
285. Eg., Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. CL 1827 (1989); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240 (9th Cir.
1989); Hayes v. Sweat, 889 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1989).
286. Compare State Bank of St. Charles v. Camnic, 712 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir.) (summary
judgment for defendants who neither knew nor should have known of decedent's suicidal
tendencies), cert denied, 464 U.S. 995 (1983) with Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers,
792 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1986) (defendants may be held liable in constitutional tort when they had
notice of decedent's suicidal tendencies).
287. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1004-05 (1989).
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III. CONCLUSION
Some commentators and some lower courts treat DeShaney as a
blanket prohibition on constitutional tort liability for government
inaction, applicable to all cases except those where the victim is invol-
untarily confined. These courts and commentators read the decision
far more broadly than its ambiguous and fragmentary directives war-
rant. The only firm rule laid down in DeShaney is that officials owe no
duty to help a person unless the state played at least some part in
creating a peril or in rendering the victim more vulnerable to it. It
would appear that the policeman who stands by as a child is beaten
and robbed need not fear a constitutional tort suit. Hopefully, the
Court will someday reconsider this rule in light of considerations of
justice and the pervasive role of government in modern life. For now,
it seems set in stone.
This Article has focused on another set of cases-those in which the
state is somehow implicated in the victim's predicament, yet not solely
responsible for it. In these cases, the question of whether and when
state inaction violates the due process clause remains open. Here
DeShaney is confused and contradictory. The opinion at one point
seems to indicate that involuntary confinement will be required, at
another that anyone placed by the state in a "worse position than that
in which he would have been had it not acted at all"28 can sue for an
official's failure to help him. The Court's uncertainty with respect to
this issue suggests that DeShaney is only the first step in the construc-
tion of constitutional tort doctrine for government inaction.
The best approach to such cases is to begin from the premise, abun-
dantly supported in the Court's precedents, that the due process clause
protects a person's life and health against egregious misconduct by
government officers. Any state involvement that significantly imperils
someone, in any of the ways discussed in Part III, should be enough to
escape the barrier erected in DeShaney against liability for the
uninvolved official. Once this threshold is overcome, the key consider-
ation should be the official's state of mind. If the evidence regarding
his knowledge and motives warrants characterizing his attitude
toward the victim's plight as "deliberate indifference," then the plain-
tiff makes out a good claim.
This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's work in other
areas of constitutional tort, and it is well supported in lower court case
law on liability for government inaction. Most important, it responds
288. Id. at 1006.
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to the sense that government officials sworn to uphold a Constitution
centrally concerned with individual rights should, in fact, treat per-
sons with the barest modicum of humanity and respect.
